The unit provided tactical airlift of troops and cargo, participated in joint airborne training with Army forces, and took part in tactical exercises in the United States and overseas. The wing provided aeromedical airlift and flew humanitarian missions as required. From until it was inactivated, the th usually had two or more tactical squadrons deployed overseas at any one time, supporting airlift operations in Central America, Europe, the Middle East, the Far East, and Southeast Asia.
While attached to the wing, the squadron supported Operation Red Wing , atomic weapon tests on Bikini and Eniwetok atolls in the Marshall Islands from February through June The squadron was inactivated in September , after the Air Force conceded the helicopter airlift mission to the Army. In November, the wing converted to the dual deputy organization, the wing's th Troop Carrier Group was inactivated, and the th , th , and th Troop Carrier Squadrons were assigned directly to the wing.
The wing's three assigned squadrons, meanwhile, began trading their Cs for Providers before the end of the year. Project Mule Train provided airlift support in Vietnam early in the United states' involvement, and was supported by deployed Cs. Four of the planes were stationed in Thailand, while the remainder were stationed at Da Nang Air Base , Vietnam, where they were attached to the d Combat Cargo Group. In July , the Air Force decided to make its airlift in Vietnam regular, and on 1 July, the th on its second deployment and located at Tan Son Nhut Airport and the th Squadrons were reassigned to the th Troop Carrier Group , which had replaced the d in December Their crews and planes located in Vietnam were transferred to the newly-activated th and th Troop Carrier Squadrons on 1 July, and they were returned to the th Wing on 8 July as paper units.
On 1 April, the th Troop Carrier Squadron was activated and the wing's remaining Providers and associated resources were assigned to it. In , the Simba rebellion began in the Congo and rebels gained control of large areas of the eastern part of the country, including Stanleyville and the United States consulate there, taking several State Department employees and others captive. The Wing's commitment increased to 14 aircraft with the development of an expanded rescue plan called Operation Dragon Rouge.
These aircraft, from the th and th Squadrons, were on rotation duty with the d Air Division at Evreux Air Base , France and were conveniently located to airlift Belgian forces. Once the city was secured, The Cs began shuttling refugees out of the city, under fire as they departed, and with passengers on each plane.
Five aircraft were damaged as 2, refugees were evacuated. In April , the United States decided to deploy troops to the Dominican Republic following the start of a civil war there. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. The photograph is identified as being taken in Vietnam in However, the wing units' deployments to Vietnam were earlier. Haulman, p. These plans were changed after the force was already in the air. Kosovo and Chechnya provide examples. After losing the propaganda war in 96, senior Russian strategists developed a concentrated media plan to target popular support for actions during the second Chechen war.
The Internet can also be employed as a defensive technique, primarily by guarding against defacement of official Web sites and databases. Filtering and blocking software can be installed on individual computers, at an Internet service provider, or on country gateways linking to the rest of the world, and Web sites themselves can block users based on Internet protocol addresses, which can identify particular computers as well as their locations. The Internet is an inevitable extension of the battlefield, and using it as a critical capability for psychological operations in war is essential.
Clearly, a growing number of state and nonstate actors are taking advantage of this tool, given its low cost, particularly in less developed nations. Equally obvious is the need to amend existing policies to allow PSYOP assets to embrace the range of contemporary media. Although current international law restricts many aspects of psychological operations, there is ample legal room for the United States as well as its enemies to conduct psychological operations using modern technology and media such as the Internet. As the Defense Science Board warned, while the U.
Thus the Armed Forces must address the use of the Internet for psychological operations directly and explicitly as an integral asset instead of as an uncontrollable instrument whose role is determined by happenstance or afterthought. Although the evolution of technology facilitates the development of effective nonlethal weapons, shifts in the strategic environment and nature of warfare also give rise to interest in their utility.
Over the last decade defense officials and strategic thinkers around the world concluded that a fundamental change in the conduct of wara revolution in military affairs RMA is underway. Most agree that non-lethality is part of this development. But except for a few futurists, defense analysts and military leaders regard nonlethality as a sub-theme in force planning, largely because the revolution in military affairs has been considered technological and operational, assuming that the nature of war will remain constant.
But global trends suggest otherwise. Some changes underway in the form and substance of warfare indicate that more lethal forces are not Steven Metz is research professor of national security affairs and director of the Future Landpower Environment Project at the U. Non-lethality can play a significant role, but its continued development is not guaranteed. To help it reach its full potential, policymakers must treat such weapons as fundamental to the revolution in military affairs. Thinking in this field must become historic and strategic. Lost in the Woods Few publications and discussions that stimulate thought on the revolution in military affairs accord non-lethality a central role.
This is not to say that the defense establishment is disinterested. Overseen by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and chaired by the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, the group supported policies and programs to foster development and fielding, advocating an approach modeled on the Strategic Defense Initiative. But for the Pentagon this proved to be too much too soon.
When the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition argued that existing programming architecture could adequately handle non-lethal weapons, his opposition helped blunt the findings of the study group. Military operations in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti as well as the domestic disaster at Waco revived interest in the subject. The impetus came from commanders rather than strategic theorists. By identifying counterproliferation, information warfare, peace operations, and military operations other than war as high priorities, the Commission on Roles and Missions lent support to advocates of non-lethal weaponry.
This organization, dealing strictly with joint non-lethal programs and with tactical applications, soon developed a joint concept for non-lethal weapons. JNLWD also has academic partners.
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Maes Simulating crowd control,United Arab Emirates. In a policy statement issued in the Alliance declared It is NATO policy that non-lethal weapons, relevant concepts of operations, doctrine, and operational requirements shall be designed to expand the range of options available to NATO military authorities.
JNLWD has endeavored to winnow out nonlethal technology unlikely to be either effective or affordable and focused on suitable technologies. Recently, for instance, it attracted attention by unveiling a vehicle-mounted active denial system, with which a transmitter fires two-second bursts of focused microwave energy that causes burning sensations on skin up to yards away. This system can break up an unruly mob without killing or maiming. The Marine Corps has been the most active in assessing and developing nonlethal weapons.
While the Air Force has shown less interest, it has made some astute contributions. The Army set the parameters for its efforts in with the publication of Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet , Concept for Nonlethal Capabilities in Army Operations while many Navy programs are designed to work in conjunction with the Coast Guard on the drug interdiction mission. JNLWD and service programs focus on nonlethal technology with tactical applications.
But most work on the strategic, political, and normative levels has taken place outside the defense establishment at national laboratories and institutes. Moreover, there is interest in Congress where Senator Bob Smith, the chairman of the Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, became a vocal supporter, arguing that non-lethal weapons can offer U. Part of the problem is the structure of the defense establishment. A study conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations in found that JNLWD had not attained the degree of authority intended by Congress because the services want to maintain full control over weapon and system development.
Although such problems can be easily overcome, conceptual obstacles are more difficult. Official pronouncements repeatedly stress that the revolution in military affairs will make the Armed Forces more lethal. Mainstream thinking is forward looking with regard to technological and operational concepts but conservative when it comes to the global strategic environment and the nature of conflict. It focuses largely on stateon-state warfare where a belligerent commits aggression for geostrategic reasons or to seize natural resources.
Subsequently, a U. The American revolution in military affairs thus sees future armed conflict as a reprise of the Persian Gulf War. Yet state-on-state warfare involving conventional combined-arms combat may not be the most common or even the most strategically significant form of armed conflict in the 21stcentury. War may in fact undergo a devolution. Some analysts contend that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, will obviate traditional state-on-state war.
There may be instances when an the Marine Corps has been the most active in assessing and developing non-lethal weapons Spraying fake pepper spray during exercise. Marine Corps Nathan J. The revolution in military affairs, in other words, may be a classic example of preparing for the last war. Three broad sources are likely to pose the most common and complex security problems in coming decades: domestic disruptions and instability; economics or ethnicity; and organized crime or other transnational issues. None are amenable to the revolution in military affairs, at least as it is described in Joint Vision When advanced states undertake humanitarian intervention, fight organized crime, or combat terrorism from anti-globalization or other radical movements, a military capable of decisive victory against another state may not be very helpful.
Such operations will be fraught with moral and political ambiguities and transparent as the entire world looks on. The line between law enforcement with its restraints on the use of force and the military will be blurred. And often those against whom force is used will not be traditional enemies, but rioters, protesters, narcotraffickers, smugglers, or terrorists commingled with noncombatants. Decisive force and lethal precision munitions will have limited utility. Information technology will allow images of the use of force to be transmitted around the world in real time.
Future warfare will be theater as much as combat. To sustain public support for the use of force, governments will have to go to lengths to limit its destructiveness. The above suggests that advanced states should pursue a parallel revolution designed specifically to deal with nontraditional and nonstate threats.
Like the Joint Vision revolution, it will rely on information. But the sort of data needed will be culled from sources other than an electronic sensor-based system of systems underpinning the first revolution in military affairs. Miniaturized robotic sensors and human intelligence will be more important than overhead or orbital sensors. More importantly, the information will be less concerned with the location of physical assets than psychological factors that are beyond satellite imagery. Moreover, this second revolution must be based on minimum destruction since the theater will often be an urban environment crowded with noncombatants.
The enemy may need to be restrained rather than killed.
Department of Defense
Nonlethality will thus be a defining characteristic of the second revolution in military affairs rather than a peripheral one as it is in Joint Vision Dropping the Hammer The core dilemmas for the Armed Forces will be finding ways to execute traditional military operations while faced with weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies and performing stability and relief operations in weak or failed states.
The old adage that When your only non-lethality will be a defining characteristic of the second revolution in military affairs Subduing aggressor with flexi-cuff.
Most are highly skilled forces designed to defeat other states. They are capable of decisive victory when the enemy is identified and the rules of engagement are permissive. In the future some states are likely to use the military hammer against threats that are notnails. But advanced states will eventually find that forces that are trained, equipped, and organized for traditional warfighting missions are not effective in countering new threats. They will have to either develop alternative organizations or radically transform existing ones. The second revolution in military affairs with its dependence on non-lethality will then take shape.
The second RMA variant might prove beneficial. States that embrace it might be effective at humanitarian intervention, peace operations, counterproliferation, and counternarcotics. Moreover, they might not cause inadvertent destruction and thus sustain public support.
But the second variant could have adverse outcomes. Non-lethality can allow decisionmakers to avoid tough choices associated with using force. Or if force is used without bloodshed, decisionmakers might be tempted to intervene in internal conflicts where they might otherwise have resisted. In the long term, lowering the threshold for intervention may be a mixed blessing. Lives may be saved but the net result may be increased global violence.
Sadly, most internal conflicts must run their bloody course before the antagonists are ready for resolution. Serious negotiations only occur when both sides tire of violence. Outside intervention may hold the lid on a boiling pot and thereby postpone resolution rather than facilitate it.
Most ominously, the second RMA variant could threaten individual rights. Miniaturized sensors could erode privacy, which is a core Western value. And non-lethal weapons would be considered usable under more circumstances. Particularly frightening, non-lethal weapons could have psychological rather than physiological effects. For instance, would restrictions on using a weapon that causes fear be less than those of a firearm?
Since most restrictions on the use of force, whether by militaries or law enforcement agencies, are based on deadly force, the development of effective non-lethality will require reformulating those rules to preserve human and civil rights. This reformulation will be a vital component of the second variant of the revolution in military affairs. Strategists tend to focus on the technological aspects of conflict or on strategic, operational, and tactical issues over the political and normative framework of warfare.
This applies to thinking on the revolution in military affairs, which attempts to harness emerging technology with the larger strategic framework and assumes that both who fights and under what conditions remain constant. But trends suggest that traditional interstate war using the time-tested laws of conflict is unlikely to be the primary security challenge of the 21stcentury.
In all probability, non-lethality will be key in responding to new threats. But developing non-lethal weaponry will create a need for altering or reconstructing the political and normative framework of armed conflict.
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Ultimately, this will be the most difficult and important challenge. Today, more than fifty years later, we should reflect on the courage, sacrifice, and devotion of the men and women who served during the conflict. Indeed, I hope that every American is exposed to their story over the course of the ongoing commemoration. It is equally important that those of us in uniform today consider the hard lessons of Korea in developing the strategy and force structure to meet the challenges of the 21stcentury.
Korean War Memorial. Indeed, in the best tradition of the Armed Forces, those who fought in Korea demonstrated great skill and commitment. They overcame the obstacles posed by a ruthless enemy, nature, an astounding lack of preparation, and a woeful state of readiness which was tolerated in the months and years leading to the war. In the end, they fought to a bloody draw; but by doing so, the U.
From the fight by 24thInfantry Division to slow the enemy until reinforcements arrived, to the Inchon landing by 1stMarine Division and 7thInfantry Division, to the brave flyers and sailors who patrolled the skies over Korea and waters surrounding the peninsula, young Americans rallied to the cause of freedom and proved their courage and resourcefulness time and again. The Cost of Freedom We have all heard of Pork Chop Hill and Heartbreak Ridge, but the struggle encompassed much more than a few well-known engagements.
It included thousands of aviators who flew into dense enemy fire while others faced perils at sea. It was a bitter contest against a determined, motivated, and well-equipped foe. By the time the guns fell silent in , nearly 37, Americans had made the ultimate sacrifice.
One of them was a year-old Marine lieutenant, Baldomero Lopez, who led his platoon over the seawall at Inchon on September 15, After climbing the wall, he attacked an enemy pillbox. PAGE 29 Shelton as he prepared to throw he was shot in the shoulder and chest. The grenade dropped to the ground. Realizing he had exposed his men to danger, Lopez crawled to the live grenade and pulled his body over it, absorbing the explosion and saving members of his platoon. On that day Lieutenant Lopez became a casualty of the Korean conflict.
For his action, the President posthumously bestowed on him the Medal of Honor. His display of courage in battle, self-sacrifice, and devotion to duty continues to inspire everyone in uniform to this day. Moreover, it is a vivid reminder of the price paid by America during the fight for South Korea s freedom. It is a story about standing shoulder-to-shoulder with allies who share a common ideal. Most importantly, Korea reminds us that peace dividends if not carefully calculated and prudently distributed can break the bank when it comes to readiness.
We must never again allow the euphoria surrounding the end of one war either the hot or cold variety to render us unprepared for the next. This lesson must not be forgotten. Indeed, the experience of the Korean War also suggests that the strategy of deterrence in the early s, built upon a capacity to mobilize and an ability to employ atomic weapons, needed to be reconsidered. In retrospect, the state of readiness of those American forces forward deployed was a major factor in the enemy decision to invade the South.
That gamble almost worked. If the Nation plans to depend on a strategy of deterrence to maintain peace in the future, its military capabilities and warfighting readiness must be preserved. The Joint Team Korea also reminds us of the powerful synergy and combat capability that are created when we fight as a team.
For example, jointness was only given lip service in June In addition, naval aircraft from fast carriers of Task Force 77 provided close air support and air interdiction in support of Eighth Army operations as aircraft from Fifth Air Force cleared MiGs from the skies and supported troops on the ground by raining pound bombs on enemy positions both day and night, in good weather and bad. As this account illustrates, the services worked well together when required.
They formed a joint team and focused on common goals and the pursuit of victory. But the jointness achieved in Korea was driven by operational imperatives and implemented on an ad hoc basis. In the wake of the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Armed Forces are no longer cobbled together at the last minute in a crisis. Today, the services routinely come to the fight as part of a joint task force, ideally a joint team that has planned and trained to fight as a unified combat force.
They are led by commanders who have been schooled in the art of joint warfighting and understand the unique and complementary capabilities which each member of the team can bring to the fight. In the future, when we fight it will be as a joint team. We have developed a structure designed to be more capable and better prepared for joint operations. Indeed, with the establishment of U. Moreover, we continue to expand and refine joint doctrine while pursuing new concepts that will enable us to better fight together.
Equipment is increasingly interoperable and joint forces are more capable. A powerful monument to the veterans of the Korean War stands across the Potomac River from my office at the Pentagon. It depicts a squad of men moving in the rain watchful, ready, and determined. It memorializes those Americans who fought bravely alongside their allies to free South Koreans from the grip of communist invaders. It serves as a permanent reminder to the fact that freedom does not come easily or cheaply.
On a personal level, it reminds me that when the military is called on to fight, it is individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who put their lives on the line. In the event, the Armed Forces continue to underwrite the peace, prosperity, and freedom all Americans enjoy. Fifty years after the conflict, South Korea is a free and prosperous strategic ally that radiates hope and confidence, thanks to a generation of Americans who fought the first hot war of the Cold War.
But while reflecting on the past, we should recall that maintaining peace and security falls on another generation today. They must be watchful, ready, and determined from Kansas to Kuwait, and from Kosovo to Korea. MacArthur properly concentrated on strategic issues, mainly keeping South Korea in the fight. He also dealt with coalition issues, addressing command and control as well as readiness concerns.
Moreover, he led the concept development process for Chromite. The Inchon invasion was one of the best operational-level case studies in the recent past. The rapid response to the North Korean attack of June was both bold and brilliant. Though notoriously self-centered, MacArthur was not a micromanager and he had a good sense of his role in developing a response. He then travelled by jeep to the Han River to observe South Korean forces in retreat and North Korean forces in action.
He found that morale was not sufficient to the challenge. He mourned "I've seen many retreating Korean soldiers during this trip, all with guns and ammunition at their side and all smiling and I've not seen a single wounded man. Nobody is fighting. It would be desperate, but it was my only chance. At its core was the Bluehearts plan, an indirect approach designed to shatter enemy cohesion. This concept remained the driving force in developing and executing Operation Chromite. It sought to counter the strong communist attack indirectly with limited U.
MacArthur cabled Washington to ensure that decisionmakers grasped that "the alternative is a frontal attack which can only result in a protracted and expensive campaign. General J. Lawton Collins had to supply forces and argue for naval and air assets. As MacArthur told Collins, "Unless provision is made for the full utilization of our Army-Navy-Air Force team in this shattered area, our mission will be costly in life, money, and prestige. At worst it might be doomed. In particular, his grasp of ideas such as depth and timing was crucial to his counterstroke, but his knowledge of other operational areas also warrants attention.
For example, there can be no doubt that he applied his version of the center of gravity. Seoul was the hub of all movement in the South and became the most critical node in the supply line of the communist attack. Moreover, MacArthur knew that the city had immense symbolic value and retaking it would inflict a "devastating psychological setback. MacArthur had encountered supply shortages during World War II and learned the value of operational reach. He understood enemy vulnerabilities.
Despite tactical accomplishments, as the communists moved southward their lines of communication grew increasingly exposed. This would extend enemy road networks in depth and breadth while opposing forces hardened and entrenched forward lines. Value would also accrue as the communist forces shifted tactically from movement operations to close assaults against the allied defensive line around Pusan.
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All this increased enemy dependence on supply lines and magnified the surprise effect of a deep counterassault. Balance among three subordinate efforts became a task of the FECOM staff as transport, support, and prioritizating combat power became more complex. Freedom of action for component commanders and synchronization of effort by MacArthur s staff should have been the watchword at the Dai Ichi Building in Tokyo.
But staff expertise was not abundant and components were often left to fend for themselves. The counterattack plan, however, featured the element of surprise to make up for execution inefficiencies, something that MacArthur considered the most vital element of war. Unfortunately, it is difficult to either predict or measure. CINCFE provided an estimate of the effects of surprise on the operational level to the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The very arguments you have made as to the impracticabilities involved will tend to ensure for me the element of surprise.
For the enemy commander will reason that no one would be so brash as to make such an attempt. On August 23, after detailed course of action development by a joint planning group and staff estimates by service component staffs, MacArthur conducted an estimate to select a course of action for the counterattack. The staff made recommendations after an analysis of potential options and reactions. Doyle was the most experienced amphibious officer in the Far East.
He had studied Inchon and alternative sites and, with others, attempted to dissuade MacArthur from executing Bluehearts. But CINCFE would not abandon Because of this commitment to an indirect attack on a key vulnerability, MacArthur drove planning in ways that most regarded as extreme, especially those who did not share his operational vision. His plan was also disconcerting because it was not primarily oriented on the enemy. In his first call to Washington for reinforcements on July 7, the benefits of Chromite were not immediately obvious to the Pentagon. Collins denied the request because he, like others in Washington, feared a global conflict.
The Marines could maximize naval striking power and execute deep penetration with special units, a plus over the concept of using 1stCavalry Division as the heart of the counterattack. By August 23, numerical parity between the two combatant forces north of Pusan was surpassed and Walker soon had , soldiers and marines with tanks.
More important for the long term, his supply lines moved 1, tons each day. The enemy had reached a culminating point while Eighth Army was growing stronger. Simultaneity requires that, once vulnerable, an enemy should be hit across the range of operations and in every combat dimension for maximum effect. By July 15, the need for cohesive air operations was such that a new form of authority known as coordination control was instituted by MacArthur to breech service impasses, deconflict operations, and improve effectiveness. During the same week, pilots under Stratemeyer started large-scale bombing within the theater of operations but outside normal control of Walker s advanced ground elements.
From then on the full capability of FECOM air forces was brought to bear on the enemy, from strategic marshalling areas down to tactical employment by B 29s for ground forces. This included land-based Marine air in support of the Pusan Perimeter. An alternative, attacking Kunsan, was seen as ineffective and indecisive. After assessing Kunsan, MacArthur commented it would be a short envelopment which would not envelop.
It would not sever or destroy the enemy s supply lines or his distribution center and would therefore serve little purpose. On August 29, after anxious debate, the Joint Chiefs formally concurred, although they continued to be concerned over the risks while MacArthur remained firm. His cable to Washington on July 23 had said that the operation planned midSeptember is amphibious landing of a two-division corps in rear of enemy lines for purpose of enveloping and destroying enemy forces in conjunction with attack from the south by Eighth Army.
The nature of the defenses around Pusan in late August also pushed for early action. This problem had greatly concerned Collins, particularly because it required withdrawing 1stMarine Brigade and its tactical airpower from Pusan before the assault. Collins felt that a weakened Eighth Army might not be able to break out or would suffer crippling fights along the miles to the link-up point.
Timing among these various efforts would be orchestrated specifically by MacArthur based on conditions at the moment.
The plan had to be flexible, but it clearly relied on the Inchon landing shocking and demoralizing the enemy immediately prior to the attack by Walker. The only reserve kept to counter the friction of war was an airborne regimental combat team in all likelihood only useful to soften an impending defeat. In keeping with doctrine, the initial phase of the operation was run by Admirals Arthur Struble and Doyle. After pre-assault bombardment and advanced force operations, X Corps captured Inchon on September 15 and advanced toward Seoul.
Rapidly retaking the capital was key to creating the effect that MacArthur needed. Walker had already started his breakout on September But in the first five days Eighth Army had little success. The effects of the Inchon attack did not appear until September MacArthur knew the tide of battle had turned. He remembered determining the hour for best effect on the enemy with apparent calm saying, Kimpo was captured and signs of weakness began to be evident in front of Walker.
I directed him to attack. Soon there was complete disintegration and Eighth Army was chasing a fleeing mob. Stratemeyer and Joy had hammered out an airspace control plan that integrated the JTF 7 amphibious operation area in the FEAF attack plan, including both strategic and tactical targets. Although MacArthur retained command of the U. That was just as well because MacArthur was not in a position to take an active role in what was a largely tactical event.
Thus the operational commander gave authority to his subordinates and watched for exceptions, prepared to intervene. Breakout MacArthur established command and control for Operation Chromite to ensure appropriate warfighting headquarters on the operational level the equivalent of a component command today. Stratemeyer took on the operational air command function from the initial U.
Thereby Joy and his staff could remain focused on the big picture and continue to support the FECOM staff as its naval component. Liaison officers were exchanged among headquarters and their numbers increased as planning continued. JTF 7 had even been allocated an amphibious operations area to deconflict support operations with ongoing efforts by Far East Air Forces FEAF but otherwise had flexibility to execute the plan as required. By then, joint force coordination was being accomplished on several levels and by several joint groups.
This was not regarded as novel in , as the lessons of World War II had proven time and again. But it is surprising that such practices fell into disuse after the Korean armistice and were nearly forgotten during Vietnam. Fortunately, they returned during the AirLand Battle era of the s and s. The Armed Forces readopted many of these tools because they were particularly appropriate for warfare on the operational level. Some of MacArthur s contributions to Operation Chromite seem applicable for the kit bag of today.
The first is the recognition that operations on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels are related but not cohesive. Success on one level cannot balance deficiencies on the others over the long term. The operational brilliance of MacArthur turned the tide against the North Koreans despite tactical deficiencies and lack of strong regional policy, but without strategic context it soon led to overconfidence, his relief by Truman, and stalemate in theater.
Operational brilliance cannot overcome tactical defeats or strategic shortsightedness. Effectively balancing centralized planning and decentralized execution a maxim of current joint operations was a practice of MacArthur. Although he dominated concept development, he established supported commanders in their areas of operation Walker within the Pusan Perimeter, Stratemeyer in overall air support operations, and Struble in the amphibious objective and trusted them to conduct their specialties. He intervened to minimize conflicts but not to micromanage. MacArthur s dominance provided a vision for staff and component action that reinforced the aim.
Through long bleak weeks he almost singlehandedly kept efforts focused on the desired operational outcome. He knew command relations and ensured unity of effort. He was hampered more than commanders today by service rivalries that distorted achievements and used the media as a weapon to undermine the joint team. Still he worked with subordinates, particularly Stratemeyer, to resolve conflicts or mitigate them. He also extended the same type of activities to multinational partners.
Even superb commanders make mistakes. MacArthur misjudged the size and implications of the communist attack. Still he was an inspirational leader, even in the eyes of his critics, and one who orchestrated all the elements of the U. Douglas MacArthur understood operational art. After decades in uniform he valued service core competencies, sensed the critical elements of battle, grasped crucial vulnerabilities, maintained good timing for large-scale operations, and knew where to focus. An asymmetrical attack on the enemy rear was his response to the reality that he could not wage attrition war and win.
He could not adequately describe the effect required because few commanders had his operational expertise.
They doubted that the cohesion of an enemy force could be shattered by such a risky maneuver; but they recognized it when the enemy disintegrated in late September. Army Military History Institute, pp. The United States occupied the southern zone while the north was controlled by the Soviet Union. The north held separate elections that autumn which led to the formation of the Democratic People s Republic of Korea and inauguration of Kim Il-Sung as president.
The Soviets aided in the buildup of the North Korean military, while Kim pressed Josef Stalin for support to unify the country by force. He said The people of the southern portion of Korea trust me and rely on our armed might Lately I do not sleep at night, thinking about how to resolve the question of the unification of the whole country Further Kim stated that when he was in Moscow, Comrade Stalin said to him that it was not necessary to attack the south; in case of an attack on the north of the country by the army of Rhee Syngman, then it is possible to go on the counteroffensive to the south of Korea.
But since Rhee Syngman is still not instigating an attack, it means that the liberation of the people of the southern part of the country and the unification of the country are being drawn out, that he thinks that he needs again to visit Comrade Stalin and receive an order and permission for offensive action by the People s Army for the purpose of the liberation of the people of Southern Korea. Cable from Stalin to Shtykov on January 30, Ireceived your report.
I understand the dissatisfaction of Comrade Kim Il-Sung, but he must understand that such a large matter in regard to South Korea such as he wants to undertake needs large preparation. The matter must be organized so that there would not be too great a risk. If he wants to discuss this matter with me, then I will always be ready to receive him and discuss it with him. Transmit all this to Kim Il-Sung and tell him that I am ready to help him in this matter.
With support from Stalin, the war began with a surprise attack across the 38thParallel on June 25, Josef Stalin. The United States must be able to deploy limited forces around the world for ambiguous missions in ad hoc coalitions. It is likely that operational planners may find themselves on unfamiliar terrain, in a theater lacking logistic and intelligence support, and without command and control tailored to the mission, similar to the situation that confronted MacArthur after Inchon. In T he Korean War is a case study in operational art, not only historically but as a paradigm for U.
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Military Academy. This organization was designated X Corps and assigned one Army and one Marine Corps division that were placed in reserve until the Inchon operation began. That assumption proved erroneous. Change of Mission While U. Above all, no forces commanded by MacArthur were allowed to enter Manchuria or the Soviet Union, and no naval or air action could be undertaken against doctrinal terms, the command was defeated when it passed the operational culminating point without gaining its objectives.
Elements of these problems arguably existed, but they offer little understanding of how UNC operations fell into disarray on the eve of the Chinese counterstroke and why miscalculation turned to calamity. The reversal shows that it was a failure of operational command and control more than single-mindedness on the part of MacArthur that made defeat inevitable. After a period of consolidation and unit boundary adjustment dictated by tactical withdrawals of forward elements, the final offensive began on November Within 72 hours, the Chinese had struck hard at several points on an extended front and threatened to cut off major forces inside North Korea.
Though U. By Christmas, UNC found itself almost exactly where it had set out three months earlier. It was an entirely new war. In deference to jointness, planning was carried out by a joint strategic plans and operations group JSPOG , but the lack of balanced representation from all services prevented it from being truly joint. MacArthur was also Commander, U.
When Walker became commander of ground forces in July , the area of responsibility of Eighth Army was simply extended to Korea, and this subregion was designated Eighth Army Korea to differentiate it from the base structure. Although Walker effectively exercised control of South Korean army units, he did not have command authority over them. As quickly as a skeleton corps headquarters could be organized in the continental United States, it was rushed to the theater.
Finally, as a matter of policy, he was prohibited from using non-Korean forces in northern provinces bordering Manchuria and the Soviet Union. As long as these conditions obtained, MacArthur was enjoined to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38thParallel. Likewise, the FECOM staff had earlier completed a preliminary estimate of the post-Inchon situation and already was drafting courses of action based on the assumption that the President would not settle for restoring the 38thParallel.
But CINCFE obviously had not communicated his concept of operations; nor had the staff validated assumptions of their plans. One day before receiving the directive from the Joint Chiefs, MacArthur surprised the staff by calling for developing plans for an offensive into North Korea which would feature another deep amphibious envelopment, in conjunction with a cross-country advance across the 38thParallel. Although he did not specify the formation to be used for the amphibious landing, there was obviously only one candidate X Corps. MacArthur s principal staff officers had assumed that he intended to give Walker command of X Corps.
The staff of Eighth Army shared this mistaken assumption and planned accordingly: after Seoul was retaken, X Corps would continue the attack north toward Pyongyang, maintaining the offensive as Eighth Army came up behind. Depending on conditions, X Corps might continue the thrust in the west toward the Yalu or move laterally along the Pyongyang-Wonsan corridor to help the South Koreans advance along the east coast. In either event, operations by both forces would be coordinated under Walker. Because Inchon had originally been conceived as only one pincer of a double envelopment with a second amphibious operation on the east coast, JSPOG had gathered data on likely landing sites, and within hours of receiving guidance from MacArthur was able to give him an outline plan.
At no time, however, was the air campaign fully integrated into operational level planning. Finally, there seems not to have been a means of disseminating guidance to staff principals. Perhaps this is because of the failure to name a permanent replacement for Almond, who was chief of staff when selected to command X Corps and expected to resume that post after the campaign.
Given MacArthur s Olympian style of command, in which access to his office in the Tokyo Dai Ichi Building was limited to advisors, there was no conduit for the routine exchange of critical information. X Corps would land at Wonsan to encircle enemy forces escaping north across the 38thParallel and remain under the direct command of MacArthur. Adding insult to injury, Walker was also ordered to provide logistic support to X Corps without control over operations, imposing an added 38thParallel.
MacArthur accepted the hybrid plan, calling for X Corps to land at Wonsan and be prepared either to effect a juncture with Eighth Army, advancing in the west to take Pyongyang, or advance north to the coastal industrial complex of Hamhung-Hungnam. X Corps would constitute an operational maneuver force under MacArthur. He apparently based his concept of operations on four assumptions, which seem not to have been explicitly stated but tacitly accepted as conditions for operations in North Korea. First, the extremely difficult, nearly trackless mountain terrain running north-south divided maneuver into eastern and western sectors.
Second, given the primitive transport system and efficiency of Far East Air Forces in interdiction, logistic support throughout North Korea could not be sustained from Inchon and Pusan alone. Third, a turning movement on the east coast might cut off large numbers of North Koreans who had escaped across the 38thParallel. MacArthur had identified remnants of the North Korean army as the enemy center of gravity, which was true as long as his fourth assumption remained valid.
Walker was soon disabused of the notion that he would get X Corps under his command. Informed of this plan, the Eighth Army staff objected vigorously. They believed their forces could reach Wonsan faster by road from Seoul, which was substantiated by a report on October 1 that South Koreans under Walker had crossed the 38thParallel on the east coast highway against negligible enemy resistance. Furthermore, Eighth Army would be forced to delay its offensive for lack of supplies because of requirements to embark X Corps elements through Inchon and Pusan.
Adding their voices, Commander, Naval Forces Far East, and his staff objected to the amphibious operation as unnecessary, holding with the Army that X Corps could march there faster than they could be lifted. Perhaps Navy planners, realizing they no longer enjoyed the element of surprise, foresaw the slow and dangerous job of clearing Wonsan harbor of mines.
But MacArthur held to his plan for a Wonsan amphibious landing. FECOM could not support an operational commander. First, it had been raided for officers to serve in the nascent X Corps headquarters. Second, there was a lack of joint service expertise; naval and air planners had served component commanders and were seen as outsiders.
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The lack of a joint campaign plan was most conspicuous in the realm of air-ground coordination until CINCFE named Lieutenant General George Stratemeyer, Commander, Far East Air Forces, as operational controller of all land-based air operations and coordination controller of all carrier-based Navy and Marine air operations. In October the advance of Eighth Army would be limited by the logistic situation; its troops had nearly reached Pyongyang before it got supplies through Inchon. Yet it was not relieved of logistic support responsibility for X Corps until well after the landing at Wonsan and beginning of operations in North Korea.
This burden was so onerous, according to General Matthew Ridgway, USA, that to have given Walker tactical control of X Corps would have added little to the load already awarded him. Inevitably, mutual resentment arose between the two commands. The X Corps staff wrestled with problems beyond its organizational abilities, performing army-type functions with a corps-size staff. The decision by CINCFE to coordinate the operations of both the eastern and western maneuver forces from Tokyo was based on an appreciation of the nearly impassable terrain separating them.
Yet the assignment of theater logistic responsibility to Eighth Army indicates a lack of such understanding. One must conclude that MacArthur was out of touch with the situation as the campaign shifted to the offensive. In the final event, those who had expressed doubts concerning the efficacy of the Wonsan operation were proven right: South Korean troops advancing up the east coast took the town on October 11, several days before the last X Corps units had even boarded transports.
If the merits of the Wonsan landing appeared dubious, the operation was soon to become a debacle. The Navy found Wonsan Harbor heavily mined. The Chinese attacks ceased on November 6 as suddenly as they had begun, leaving Eighth Army holding a shallow bridgehead across the Chongchon, but with a South Korean corps crippled. To the east, X Corps encountered Chinese in divisional strength but repulsed them with limited losses. There, too, the enemy forces broke contact. On November 14 another ominous sign was recorded as the temperature plummeted some 40 degrees to well below zero.
Nevertheless, Walker made clear that he had no intention of going on the defensive, bringing up IX Corps in the center to renew the advance in greater strength. Similarly, there was confidence in Almond s headquarters. Diminishing contacts led its assistant chief of staff for intelligence to conclude that the enemy was again withdrawing. This optimism was striking given the circumstances. FECOM had sufficient intelligence by mid-November to raise serious doubts over the wisdom of plunging into the unknown. MacArthur was privy to key national intelligence reports, which suggested hardening resolve by the Chinese leadership to intervene, and he had information on the movement of additional enemy forces into Manchuria.
That the intelligence community regarded such indicators as ambiguous does not let theater intelligence analysts off the hook, for they were receiving concrete tactical information that, together with national reporting, suggested exercising greater caution in renewing the offensive. Yet the FECOM intelligence staff appeared unable to provide an unqualified forecast or clear warning. Indecisiveness over enemy capabilities and intentions was found in vacillating, even contradictory daily intelligence estimates. In the absence of solid intelligence, the fact that MacArthur relied on his own intuition that the Chinese were bluffing is more understandable.
But probably the most pernicious effect of the operation befell Eighth Army in the west: not until October 9 did its spearhead division strike across the 38thParallel for Pyongyang, delayed primarily by supply shortages. When it became clear that the capital of North Korea could fall to U. The line ran north-south, generally along the watershed of the Taebaek Mountains, to an objective line deep inside North Korea corresponding to the limit of advance directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for non-Korean elements.
Eighth Army was to advance to the western extension of the line, X Corps to the eastern. On the eve of the X Corps landing, MacArthur modified his instructions, ordering both commanders to drive rapidly to the Yalu River. Red Dawn With Wonsan and Pyongyang both in friendly hands, the concept of two operational forces maneuvering independently on either side of the Taebaek range appeared eminently sound. It minimized the difficulties imposed by formidable terrain and promised rapid destruction of the North Korean army as an organized force, assuming the continued forbearance of the Soviet Union and China.
But events almost immediately cast doubt on that assumption. Eighth Army units encountered Chinese troops for the first time on October 25, north of the Chongchon River. The following night, the Chinese struck at South Korean forces on the right of Eighth Army and over the next three days caused the South Koreans to pivot northeast to face the main enemy attack. That created a huge gap in the Eighth Army front, leaving open the right flank of I Corps.
There were serious problems with that idea. Most obvious was that it assigned a mission that was basically incompatible with the scheme of operational maneuver: the main reason for control of X Corps as a separate force by the operational commander was the impracticality of coordinating its operations with Eighth Army.
Avenues of approach from the line of contact were extremely restricted because of rugged, compartmented terrain, a paucity of usable roads, and the virtual impossibility of cross-country motorized movement. The difficulty of mounting mutually supporting operations across the Taebaek Mountains had been illustrated by the fact that, despite several efforts following the Chinese attacks in October, it had been impossible to establish patrol contact between Eighth Army and X Corps. There was almost no liaison between the fronts in November. After Seoul was retaken, its personnel rarely visited the theater.
The essential misunderstanding by JSPOG of enemy strengths and weaknesses reflected its lack of firsthand familiarity with the ground on which U. There seems to have been little awareness in Tokyo that, once in motion, X Corps forward elements might find themselves on the end of a long and precarious limb if anything went wrong. As Almond later put it, the principal problem facing me as X Corps commander, with a fighting force extended over a mile front, was how to concentrate these forces to meet a rapidly deteriorating tactical situation.
Heavy counterattacks halted an attack by 1stMarine Division, while major elements of 7thInfantry Division were isolated and under heavy pressure. Having done everything humanly possible, MacArthur announced that his plan for the immediate future was to pass from the offensive to the defensive with such adjustments as were dictated by a constantly fluid situation. He concluded that the ultimate objective of the Chinese was undoubtedly the complete destruction of U. Perhaps it can be attributed in part to the fact that MacArthur had not seen the ground on which the campaign would be fought.
Prior to Inchon he had visited Korea only three times, and there is no indication that he conducted a personal reconnaissance north of Seoul. If allocation of resources is the key logistic problem on the operational level, control of the logistic spigot also gives an operational commander the means to either weight the main effort or change its direction by reinforcing success.
Making the commander of Eighth Army responsible for resupply of X Corps, a force not under his control, reduced MacArthur s flexibility to exploit tactical advantages developed on either front, quite apart from seriously encumbering Eighth Army at the critical point in the campaign. The Eighth Army-X Corps predicament demonstrates a major difficulty with multiple lines of operation in a single campaign: it tends to produce competition for resources which might better be concentrated in support of one commander or the other. The greatest operational failure for the offensive was intelligence.
Operational intelligence represents the point of convergence of national and tactical intelligence collection. It collates data from both above and below, correlates it with weather and terrain, and disseminates to subordinate commanders what they need to know. Above all, operational intelligence provides estimates on enemy intentions and capabilities. In general, the more prior strategic intelligence preparation of the battlefield is afforded to theater commanders, the more operational intelligence will have a better feel for enemy intentions than national intelligence agencies.
The Korean War was unique because it was fought on the margin of U. It was also fought on the periphery in the sense that resources were limited present strength was insufficient to meet this undeclared war by the Chinese with the inherent advantages which accrue thereby to them. But that flaw need not have been fatal if the command and control system had provided CINCFE some margin for rashness, accidents, or chance. The system was simply unequal to the demands. In essence, it lacked the structure and flexibility to succeed. FECOM had not been a joint headquarters when the war began, nor did it become joint until long afterwards.
Its staff tended to see the conflict almost exclusively in terms of the ground component, thus naval and air coordination was usually an afterthought. Certainly contributions by the four services were never synchronized in a single operational campaign plan, although the Inchon landing was clear evidence of the tactical merits of synchronization. This points to perhaps the most difficult task in a contingency like Korea: tailoring a joint operational staff that is functionally organized to deal with the specific problem at hand.