For such dedication, I express my gratitude by dedicating this volume to Diane, a valued collaborator and friend. WWF March The articles reprinted in this volume are listed below with the place of original publication. I am most grateful to the named journals and publishers for granting me permission to reprint. Anton and A. Barnes et al. Amden et al. MuellerGoldingen and K. I The articles brought together in the present volume were written over a period of more than forty years. Far from being a simple control on the desires or drives that men share with animals, it guarantees the correctness of various judgments important to virtuous human action.
I also began to read what modern philosophers were saying about emotions and what may be called character traits. In regard to the former, I came to realize that Aristotle had anticipated much of the work being done by modern philosophers, in that he analyzed emotions like anger and fright in terms of belief and goal directed action. These two insights were for me a major breakthrough, as a result of which a series of seminal articles were written—some at the. Several others dealt with emotion. The consequences for rhetoric and ethics were clear. In the former, emotional appeal came to be viewed as reputable, because it can and often does proceed by reasonable arguments that determine what a listener believes and therefore what emotion he experiences.
In the latter, emotional response was recognized as an intelligent form of human behavior that can be reasonable as well as unreasonable. In addition, moral virtue came to be viewed as a correct disposition in regard to emotion: e. In a separate article, I distinguished between moral virtue and practical wisdom by reference to the everyday distinction between emotional response and reasoned deliberation.
The former is the sphere of moral virtue and the latter that of practical wisdom. Plato made use of the distinction in his Laws, and Aristotle made it the basis of his moral or bipartite psychology, i. The former is concerned with all living things.
It recognizes three faculties: a single faculty of thought, which is restricted to human beings and distinct from the faculties of sensation and nutrition, which are characteristic of animals and plants, respectively. The latter is a peculiarly human psychology. It postulates two parts, both of which are cognitive. A year in London on a grant from the American Academy of Learned Societies — was of great assistance by providing me time for research and enabling me to interact with Professor Richard Sorabji.
We gave a seminar together, in which familiar themes were expanded and new ones developed. In the immediately following years, I composed a monograph, Aristotle on Emotion,2 and wrote several articles on particular issues. Women possess deliberative capacity, but this capacity is said to lack authority. They are said to lack deliberative capacity altogether, so that they do well to follow the reasoned advice of their masters , Chapter Nevertheless, new interests came to the fore.
That project took some thirteen years to complete and resulted in a two-volume work that runs pages. For not only was I was responsible for editing the rhetorical fragments, but I had also agreed to write a commentary on these fragments. Not surprisingly, I had new thoughts on the Rhetoric, and that led to a series of eight articles.
Three were written before a stay at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study — , one during that stay, and four afterwards. Of the eight articles dealing with rhetorical topics, several are concerned with persuasion through character. Whereas Aristotle is concerned with establishing the credibility of the orator without diminishing the impartiality of the audience, Cicero recommends arousing favor in such a way that the audience becomes emotional and is no longer impartial , Chapter Two other articles focus entirely on Aristotle.
One discusses in detail the three attributes that make an orator trustworthy: wisdom, virtue and goodwill. The former is shown to be oriented toward judicial oratory, while the latter is focused on deliberative oratory , Chapter Two articles take up topics in Book 3 of the Rhetoric. One is concerned with delivery, which is characterized as vulgar and necessary rather than correct.
The other article turns our attention to expression. The earlier of the two observes that both Books 1 and 3 have two introductions and that in each case one of the introductions omits any reference to persuasion through character. The other article is a more inclusive study. One article remains for comment. It is the newest of the twentyfour articles that make up this volume.
Collections of articles by a single author are sometimes arranged chronologically, i. For that reason, an arrangement by topics or areas has been chosen, for it better enables the reader to make connections between the several articles and to appreciate the coherence of Aristotelian doctrine. The same may be said of moral virtue and deliberative capacity. Accordingly, I have not hesitated to add cross-references in the notes to articles appearing in different sections of the volume. Sometimes these references are added to existing notes. On other occasions, I have added an entirely new note.
In such cases, an asterisk has been used, in order that the original numbering of the notes may be maintained. The second is an index of subjects discussed in the articles. Here I have tried to reach a balance between citing only the most important topics and bloating the index with unimportant items. Should the account of emotion given by Aristotle in his Rhetoric be dismissed as a popular treatment that avoids precision? Their support enabled me to read and work upon this topic.
I am especially grateful to the Director of the Center for Hellenic Studies, Professor Bernard Knox, and to the Junior Fellows — for discussing with me points made in this paper. I am also indebted to Professors Glenn R. Morrow and Charles H. Kahn who have made most helpful suggestions that I have endeavored to incorporate in this paper. According to Brandis, Aristotle is concerned neither with giving an exhaustive treatment of emotions nor with pinning down their place in inner experience.
Instead Aristotle follows his general procedure see below, n. Brandis is followed by E. Whereas previous authors of rhetorical treatises had treated emotional appeal as part of the prooemium and the epilogue, Aristotle considered emotional appeal independently of particular portions of an oration. He conceived of emotional appeal as a tool that could be employed throughout an oration for the purpose of persuading the audience.
True to the method that he himself proclaimed appropriate to rhetoric,4 he did not seek exactitude but contented himself with what was generally acceptable. See F. The goal of this paper is not so much to emphasize the role Aristotle assigns to emotional appeal as to emphasize his analysis of individual emotions. It is the latter which needs to be re-evaluated. London: Methuen, ; A. Gauthier and J. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, translated by G. Berry New York: Scribner, 4.
While P. My approach will be in two parts. Secondly, in pointing out the involvement of cognition in emotion, the Rhetoric makes clear that emotions can be reasonable and that emotional appeal need not be a matter of charms and enchantments. I I begin with some concessions. These points may be admitted. But when he does so, he adopts the view as his own.
But—and this is the important point—when he claims the assent of nearly everyone, Aristotle is primarily thinking of the members of the Academy. He is not especially concerned with people in general. This is, of course, an old point. See Burnet 3 n. Still, Aristotle does not simply report the view of other members of the Academy.
He seems to modify and supplement the view and so to make it his own. It is perhaps likely that he did. In order to illustrate a particular method for rejecting alleged genera, Aristotle introduces the proposition that motion is the genus of pleasure and argues that explanation that avoided raising disputed points. I agree with Brandis in allowing the possibility that Aristotle set forth a view about which he had reservations.
Even if the dispute between Speusippus and Eudoxus was for the most part over and even if this view of pleasure had been advanced by Plato, it is unlikely that opinion within the Academy had formed a consensus in favor of this view. See also An. This group of persons is represented most especially by Speusippus. Jolif above, n. Lieberg above, n.
He may think that this argument against pleasure as a kind of motion is a telling argument, or he may not. Like other members of the Academy he was able to criticize the view of pleasure as motion, but he was also prepared on occasion, to advance the view, perhaps because he found the view on the whole acceptable or at least better than any other view current in the Academy.
Concerning the analyses of happiness and pleasure more could be said. On the general relationship between the Topics and Rhetoric see J. See also Dufour above, n. Yet neither is he following the view of professional rhetoricians. Modifying the current view, he suggested viewing rhetoric as the faculty of observing and discovering the possible means of persuasion b10—14, 25—26; cf. Topics b5— See L. Wien There is a need to add a qualifying in oratione.
Consider his definition of goodness. As in the case of happiness, so here, everybody would endorse one or more of the enumerated marks of goodness. But while the several marks of goodness would be generally accepted, they would also be accepted by Aristotle. The goods as means are all carefully grouped together a27—29 and important terms are explained a29— See also Cope, Introduction above, n. In what appears to be a carelessly written passage 2. See Cope, Introduction above, n. The example of being healthy producing health is of especial importance.
Each individual emotion, he tells us, must be analyzed in three ways. The condition of men prone to an individual emotion, the objects of an individual emotion, and the grounds for an individual emotion must all be grasped. The proper interpretation of EN a4 and b25 has been a matter of considerable discussion. For a survey of the literature see Gauthier and Jolif above, n. In analyzing the nature of individual emotions, Aristotle was providing the knowledge necessary for successfully arousing and allaying emotion b21—25, a24— Of course, the.
Such an assertion is too easily refuted by the De Anima. For while it does give the form of anger, it makes no mention of matter or a bodily correlate. These materials, it might be argued, may be popular opinions. For if an orator is to be persuasive he cannot use controversial premises. His demonstrations must begin from generally accepted premises. This argument has some force as long as it is directed at the discussion of particular premises in Book I. But it loses its force when transferred to the discussion of emotions in Book II.
For in discussing emotions Aristotle is primarily concerned with a mode of persuasion. See A. They are accepted and completed. Rather, it is used as part of and possibly to emphasize the deductive method that Aristotle employs throughout large sections of Books I and II of the Rhetoric.
Within the Academy Plato had criticized severely current rhetorical methods and had called for a new and philosophical rhetoric. Toward this end, Aristotle imposed a demonstrative method both upon his discussion of particular premises in Book I and upon his discussion of emotions in Book II. Aubenque above, n. In other words, competence in natural philosophy demands a knowledge of both form and matter. The evidence of the De Anima suggests the continuing importance of this detailed if incomplete treatment. Moreover, the mention of Deiopeithes a14 indicates that Aristotle was still using and adding to this portion of the Rhetoric at least as late as B.
At this period in his career Aristotle was very much interested in logical method. The introduction of example and enthymene into the art of rhetoric is a clear sign of this interest. Aristotle had recently spent considerable time upon treatises devoted to logical method and was probably still at work upon these treatises.
Plato, Aristotle and Socrates
Indeed, letters may be used instead of for-. Solmsen, The Rhetoric and Poetics above, n. In proceeding deductively see Solmsen quoted above, n. The following list is only a sample: With premises An. For the cases are not identical. In the Analytics Aristotle is primarily investigating logical method. In the Rhetoric Aristotle is using logical method to investigate the materials with which a rhetorician must be acquainted.
Let us start by looking at the Rhetoric itself. The failure is hardly serious. The former group he had referred to the body more accurately, itches and tickles are referred to the body, while hungers and thirsts are referred to both the body and the soul [46B8—C4, 47C1—E3] and the latter group to the soul. It is necessary, he tells us, to analyze each emotion in three ways. Unless Aristotle is confused, he does not conceive of emotions simply as inner mental or bodily feelings or sensations. They lack objects and grounds altogether.
It is thoughts and beliefs that have objects, and it is the occurrence of these cognitions in emotional response that explains why we can ask a man at whom he is angry and whether his anger is reasonable.
Plato, Aristotle and Socrates
Instead of viewing emotions simply as particular kinds of inner mental feelings or sensations that impel a man to behave in certain characteristic ways, Aristotle, we may suspect, includes cognition within his conception of emotion. Consider anger. According to Cope, the appetites involve bodily pleasures and pains, while emotions involve mental pleasures and pains. We are encouraged to think that being angry is like feeling pangs of hunger. In both cases a man experiences unpleasant sensations.
Only in the case of anger the sensations are mental and not bodily. Sensations maybe part of emotional response, but they are not the whole of it. His anger always involves the thought of unjust treatment. The thought of outrage is essential and whenever this thought is not present, neither is anger. Fear, for example, necessarily involves the thought or belief of imminent danger. The thought of impending danger is essential, so that a man cannot be afraid unless he thinks himself threatened. His emphasis upon cognition and its necessary involvement within emotional response may be said to anticipate debate among contemporary philosophers.
That is a mistake. In this context, he is careful to take note of the fact that in courts of law and deliberative assemblies, as in many other contexts, emotions are rarely grounded on certain knowledge. Rather, they are grounded upon beliefs that may turn out to be false. What appeared to be, e.
It was only an apparent insult. For fuller discussion with references to recent literature, see the epilogue to the second edition of my book Aristotle on Emotion London: Duckworth 94— For philosophical debate concerning the involvement of cognition in emotional response is not new. Refused an easy victory, Socrates undertakes a more exhaustive study of opinion and its relationship to pleasure and pain.
And what is true of pleasures and pains in general is, of course, true of painful emotions such as fear, anger and the like. Protarchus agrees and does not object. Perhaps it should be noted that Protarchus does not claim the view as his own. When Socrates congratulates him on his defense of pleasure, Protarchus modestly replies that he is merely saying what he hears 38A5. The Philebus certainly makes clear that Plato saw an intimate relationship between emotion and cognition. But the Philebus does not make precise the relationship,36 and we may guess that the relationship was still a matter of lively debate within the Academy.
Cognition, it seems, was generally considered essential to emotional response. But in what way was cognition essential? Take, for example, anger. But in what way is it essential? Is it the genus of anger? For emotions together with other kinds of pleasures and pains were a subject of current and lively debate among members of the Academy. To this Academic debate concerning the relationship between cognition and emotion, Aristotle brought his own logical skills. Agreeing with other members of the Academy that cognition and emotion are intimately connected and wishing to make clear the kind of connection that joins cognition to emotional response,39 Aristotle opted for a connection that is both essential and causal.
This stock example is especially clear and also relevant to our enquiry. What is an eclipse? It is a deprivation of light from the moon by the obstruction of the earth. Because light fails owing to the obstruction of the earth An. He is not overthrowing previous work. This is particularly true in regard to the Philebus. This dialogue had not made precise the exact relationship between cognition and emotion, but it had emphasized an intimate relationship.
Certainly Aristotle had learned much from studying this dialogue. We have already noticed a close relationship between the accounts of pleasure in the Philebus and in the Rhetoric above, Section I and n. We may add that there is close agreement between the accounts of envy given in the Philebus and Rhetoric. This is not to say that Aristotle simply rewrote the account of envy given in the Philebus. But it is to say that even if Aristotle did not borrow directly from the Philebus, he did borrow indirectly through discussion in the Academy.
The case of emotional response is similar. A man is moved to anger by a slight. We may compare An. Nevertheless, actual outrage is not essential to anger. Only the thought or imagination of outrage is essential, so that whenever a man is moved to anger he thinks or imagines himself insulted.
It is well formed and meets standards advanced in the Posterior Analytics. Fearsome things that is, those things that inspire or arouse the emotion of fear are necessarily things that appear to be harmful, because fear is by definition a pain or disturbance due to the appearance of imminent danger. It is essential to and the cause of emotional response. This answer is characteristically Aristotelian and should be recognized as such. Dufour above, n. Even in the Posterior Analytics Aristotle does not control carefully his use of prepositions. Academic debate.
It is not. It makes clear his own view that may have been worked out and fully stated in the Diaireseis. But the Rhetoric has, providing us with a rather clear indication of how Aristotle explained the relationship between cognition and emotional response. It is also important for rhetorical and ethical theory because it makes clear that emotions are not blind impulses. On the contrary, he is acting according to his judgment. When a man becomes angry, he takes revenge because he thinks himself insulted.
He is prepared to explain and justify his action by reference to an insult. He may, of course, be mistaken. He may think himself insulted when he has not been and when it should be clear to him that he has not been. But he may not be mistaken in thinking himself insulted. He may be correct in his belief and also have good reason for his belief. Upon request he can state his reason for being angry, point out that his anger is not The account of emotions presented in the Diaireseis was probably not restricted to a formal division or simple list.
On the Diaireseis, see H. It should be added that it is at least debatable whether or not Aristotle wrote a Diaireseis. The fact that the catalogue preserved by Diogenes Laertius 5. See P. The Eudemian Ethics b10—12, b34—35, a26 refers to Diaireseis concerning emotions, faculties, and dispositions. Since most scholars now accept the Eudemian Ethics as a work of Aristotle earlier than the Nicomachean Ethics, it may seem that these references in the Eudemian Ethics settle the issue.
But it would be a mistake to claim that there remains no room for doubt. Those who follow Moraux and think that the Diaireseis mentioned by Diogenes Laertius are pseudo-Aristotelian compilations may well think that the mention of such collections by the Eudemian Ethics is a sign that this treatise is not genuine. Emotional responses can be intelligent and reasonable actions. When an orator demonstrates that danger is imminent, he is arousing fear in the audience. His reasoned arguments lead the audience to conclude that danger threatens.
The hearers think their lives threatened, become frightened, and begin to think about their own safety. Fear makes them deliberate a6—7. Such men are not the victims of some irrational force that compels them to act as they do. On the contrary, their action is both intelligible and intelligent. Their fear is based upon a reasoned consideration of the situation and so is reasonable.
Moreover, it may be allayed in the same way that it was aroused. The same is true of anger. When an orator demonstrates that a particular man has acted in an outrageous and insulting manner, he excites anger in the audience. Further deliberation, however, may lead to an abandoning of this anger. The response will be intelligent and reasonable. The hearers are responding according to reasoned judgment and are not the victims of some external power. In particular, they have not abandoned their anger because of some charm or enchantment such as that advertised by Thrasymachus Phdr.
Enchantments are outside the sphere of reason. They may cause or compel a man to behave in a particular way, but such behavior should not be confused with emotional response, reasonable or unreasonable. This is an important point. As long as emotion went unanalyzed it was possible to look upon emotional appeal as a kind of persuasion distinct from and hostile to reasoned argumentation.
In the. Here emotion is depicted as something that happens to an individual. As long as this view of emotional response and emotional appeal went unchallenged it was natural to oppose the arguments of reason to the inspired incantations Hel. Similarly we can understand why Plato made Socrates reject emotional appeal in favor of instruction Apol.
Such an investigation was left for Aristotle. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 66 , Like a doctor the skillful orator proceeds systematically and may be said to operate in an artful manner. But it is the orator who acts in a rational manner. The audience is conceived of as a patient upon whom the orator works. See Segal For Gorgias being overcome by emotion is analogous to being raped. Far from being hostile to reason, emotions are amenable to reason so that an orator can arouse and allay emotion while presenting reasoned arguments. By demonstrating that no unjust outrage has occurred, the orator allays anger and by demonstrating that the defendant is an innocent victim, he excites pity.
Hungers and thirsts are bodily drives, and in general do not depend upon a particular kind of cognition. When men are hungry, it is not normally because they think that something is the case. Rather they have an empty stomach. Their hunger is explained not by reference to certain beliefs but by reference to physiological causes. In contrast emotions are explained by reference to thoughts and beliefs. They involve an assessment of the particular situation and so may be reasonable and unreasonable.
Unlike bodily drives, emotional responses are normally open to criticism and are important for understanding moral virtue. As Aristotle 47 Once again we must allow the possibility that Aristotle wrote a Diaireseis which included a study of emotion see above, n. Let me expand this point. Even though this dichotomy of an immortal and mortal soul is not conceptually identical with the dichotomy of moral psychology,54 it does help to prepare for this dichotomy.
Plutarch, Moralia B. Heinze, Xenocrates Leipzig, Teubner, —; J. Burnet above, n. This point may be developed by reference to the Timaeus. It must be held down forcibly 70A5—6. It is like a wild beast feeding at a manger 70E4—6. But hunger is not an emotion such as anger and fear. For hunger does not depend upon an appraisal of the situation but rather arises on account of physiological causes.
This may be made clearer by considering sexual desire.
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For in the Timaeus sexual desire is treated in a manner similar to hunger. Both are depicted as animals 70E4, 91A2 ; both are presented as bodily conditions immune to reason. In the case of men, sexual desire is caused by marrow in the region of the genitals 91A4—B7. In neither case does the desire depend upon an assessment of the situation. In both cases the desire is caused by bodily factors, so that relief comes not through reasoned argument but through intercourse and reproduction 91C7—D5.
And if sexual desire does not depend upon an appraisal of the situation, neither does an excess of sexual desire. Sexual intemperance does not depend upon false assessments. It deserves treatment and not censure 86C3—E3. In the Timaeus hunger and thirst and sexual desire are not treated as emotions. They are depicted as bodily drives or directed dispositions that are not on a par with emotions such as anger and fear. There is merit in this analysis. We respond to the former by meeting his need; we respond to the latter with reasoned argument.
We give a hungry man food to calm his stomach and to alleviate painful sensations. My purpose, then, is not to criticize the account of hunger and sexual desire that is presented in the Timaeus. Rather I want to emphasize that this. For bipartition is primarily a moral psychology.
It is a psychology that is useful in ethical discussion because it enables one to distinguish between deliberate actions that are preceded by reasoned deliberation and emotional responses that involve perception and assessment but are not preceded by reasoned deliberation. The agent is responsible and can give reasons that explain and justify his behavior.
In contrast the behavior that results from a directed disposition is hardly action at all. The victim of acute hunger explains his behavior not by citing reasons how he sees the situation but by citing bodily causes. He is driven and impelled. He is, as the Timaeus 86B1—87B9 points out, hardly a moral agent.
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His behavior falls outside the dichotomy of bipartition; it is like involuntary disease, not like human action. For the Timaeus maintains a tripartite psychology even in sections of the dialogue that are marked by an obvious biological interest. Emotional response may follow upon and be controlled by reasoned argumentation. We have already noticed that the reasoned arguments of an orator may lead an audience to judge that danger is imminent and so to become frightened. Still, emotional responses are frequently perhaps all too frequently not preceded by any kind of deliberation.
A man simply assesses his situation in a certain way and acts appropriately. His action is not preceded by deliberation, but it is intelligent and is open to evaluation.
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His emotional response may be said to be proper or improper. And it is the mark of a morally virtuous man that his emotional responses are correct. EN a17—22 where Aristotle describes the most courageous individual who is fearless in the face of sudden danger. He responds properly on account of his virtuous character. It is connected with avarice C6, cf.
Their appetite is not caused by a physiological disorder but based upon an erroneous assessment. It includes a thrifty element C7 , a niggardly and avaricious aspect, that cannot be construed as a directed disposition similar to hunger and thirst. They are paradigm cases of appetition, but they are not emotions. They are directed dispositions resulting from bodily causes. See the note of J. Cross and A. We can, I think, say that tripartition failed to draw a clear distinction between emotional responses and bodily drives.
He was developing a moral psychology that would serve him well in ethical and political investigations. See Arnim [above, n. Whatever the proper assignation of shame it seems clear that tripartition was not well suited for picking out the emotional side of man. It was necessary to start over and to group together emotions, including shame Rhet. It is, of course, true that Ar.
Furthermore, the Rhet. We may. Arnim Arius Didymus p. This is not the case in either the MM or the EE.
Moral virtue is explained as a. Anger is just as much a matter of plotting and taking revenging as feeling mistreated. Freiburg, Br. In this sec1 This article is an expanded and corrected version of a paper distributed to the members of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy and subsequently discussed by members of the Society on 30 December in San Francisco. My thanks go also to Professors Bernard M. Knox, Charles P. Segal and S.
Marc Cohen, who communicated to me privately their reactions to an earlier version of this paper, and to Drs. Finally, I want to acknowledge the helpful criticisms of an anonymous referee. See also my n. Bipartition is not a simple dichotomy between emotional response and means-end deliberation alone.
Here we have a partial expression of the dichotomy of bipartition. Considering herself outraged and so desiring revenge, Medea must deliberate about how to achieve revenge. As the psychic dichotomy does not oppose emotional response to means-end deliberation alone, so the distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom is not a simple distinction between perfection in regard to emotional response and perfection in regard to means-end deliberation alone.
See below, note The same distinction between emotional response and means-end deliberation is implied later when Creon confronts Medea and orders her to leave Corinth. A sharptempered person responds emotionally straightway and without deliberation. The silent and clever person does not act without deliberation. In his case, anger is the occasion for deliberation about means.
Emotion is distinct from means-end deliberation, and this distinction is part of the dichotomy of bipartition. Medea does not, of course, mean that her actions on behalf of Jason were lacking in cleverness. On the contrary she makes clear that without her skills Jason would never have escaped danger. She begins and ends her opening statement with the claim to have saved Jason [, ]. Her point is simply that reason was not controlling emotion when she aided Jason.
Her actions were motivated by the particular emotion of love. He credits Medea with a subtle mind but restricts her clever deliberations to meansend reasoning. Love was dominant and determined the course of her deliberations — He is not motivated by desire At least, Jason thinks that he can defend and justify his own behavior. But her desire for full revenge returns swiftly. This time her hesitation is of even shorter duration. Once again she determines to kill the children. She is quite conscious of the terrible path that she has chosen for herself and the even more terrible path that she has chosen for the children — But now she does not falter.
By means of this monologue Euripides has depicted a mother torn between an angry desire for total revenge and the realization that total revenge is in the long run an evil for herself and her children. From a dramatic point of view, the monologue does not set forth explicitly the dichotomy of bipartition. But if the dichotomy of bipartition is not dramatically set forth in this monologue, it is, I think, clearly implicit in the monologue. But we can say that the opposition. It is this dichotomy with which Aristotle works and which enables him at one time to treat reason as something that follows emotion and at another time to treat reason as something that controls emotion.
A virtuous man subjects his emo-. This thesis seems to me unacceptable. Perhaps similarities in vocabulary should not be pressed. More important, however, is an agreement in content. Both passages indicate one important respect in which emotion is commonly opposed to reason. Of course, Jason is deceived in this matter. But as a working hypothesis his assumption is not foolish.
In this respect his reason may be said to follow his emotion. When Aristotle says that moral virtue makes correct the goal and practical wisdom the means EN a7—9, a5—6 , he is thinking primarily of means-end deliberation in relation to emotional response. Means-end deliberation follows upon and is given direction by emotional response. He must respond out of character and without reasoning EN a17— When Odysseus and Eumaios reach the palace, they come upon the ancient and all but dead Argos.
Odysseus is moved by the pathetic sight of Argos and turns aside to wipe away a tear, unnoticed by Eumaios Od. As Plutarch comments, Odysseus fell into this situation quite suddenly and unexpectedly A. He sheds a tear but also turns away and so escapes the notice of Eumaios. The words of Melanthios stir the heart of Odysseus Unlike the sullen man who hides anger within himself, so that no one can persuade him to give up his anger EN a23—24 , the virtuous man pays attention to the reasoned arguments of others.
In other words, emotional response is often the occasion for means-end deliberation. Allen, The Philosophy of Aristotle London —, that Aristotle never wanted to restrict practical wisdom to means-end deliberations. But I cannot agree with Allen insofar as he following R. Aristotle does not mean that women cannot think straight. Women can be most clever contrivers of every kind of evil For in this play Phaedra is presented as a woman who knows that she is behaving improperly but is unable to control her behavior.
Phaedra recognizes that women are generally despised , cf. London 57— Regarding Penelope Aristotle, fragment 61 Rose3 , see note 1 on page Anger invites reasoned criticism and is frequently abandoned, if shown to be unreasonable. A disease, however, is not an emotion and is not given up, if shown to be unreasonable. Indeed, diseases are neither reasonable nor unreasonable. While an emotion like anger is grounded upon evaluation or assessment e. It is caused by bodily disorder. Reasoning, then, is related to emotion in two distinguishable ways.
It determines his account of moral virtue and practical wisdom and also his view of women. Still, this twofold relationship is not an Aristotelian discovery. Aristotle along with other members of the Academy gave the dichotomy formal recognition, but they did not invent it. Perhaps I can support this claim, and at the same time clear up a persistent misunderstanding, by focusing upon the criticism of bipartition advanced in the De Anima.
It has been widely assumed and sometimes stated that this criticism of persons advancing bipartition is in part at least a self-criticism. Heinze, Xenokrates Leipzig ; R. Hicks, Aristotle, De Anima Cambridge , cf. Jannone and E. The comments of F. The De Anima passage is concerned not only with whether or not there are spatially separate psychic parts a20 , but also and primarily with how many parts or faculties are to be recognized a The advocates of bipartition are being criticized especially for having failed to distinguish adequately between the several psychic parts or faculties a24— His remarks are directed against members of the Academy who had simply altered tripartition by collapsing the spirited and appetitive elements into a single psychic part and thereby created a particular kind of bipartite psychology.
One of these passages occurs in Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics b33—a5. Here Aristotle is trying to pin down the function of man. The reason for this is clear enough. Moraux above, note 14 44, 47 and Simplicius In De an. At the outset of the play the nurse tells us that Medea perceives herself dishonored 26, cf. Her emotional condition is not in doubt. We should note that the. The alogical soul is primarily the capacity for emotional response, while the logical soul is primarily the capacity for reasoned deliberation.
Both acts are intelligent, so that both capacities are cognitive. It is, of course, possible to extend the alogical soul to include noncognitive functions like nutrition and sensation. Aristotle does this in respect to nutrition at EN ab12 cf. EE b31— But neither nutrition nor sensation are essential components of the alogical soul. Such an attempt would be foolish. As we shall see, the Timaeus suggests such a version of bipartition.
Part of being angry is perceiving or thinking oneself outraged Rather he is criticizing a particular kind of bipartition that was developed in the Academy out of tripartition by bringing together the spirited and the appetitive faculties. The De Anima passage is quite clear in its wording. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle Oxford 3. See the remarks of H. De An. Is this a confusion? Perhaps, but only a very minor one. Apparently tripartition and this related form of bipartition enjoyed a contemporaneous life within the Academy.
While the Timaeus introduces tripartition and even assigns each of the three psychic parts its own bodily location, the Timaeus, as we have already said, presents a bipartite version of tripartition. See Dirlmeier, Nikomachische Ethik above, note 14 — This passage from the Topics names the three psychic parts of tripartition. While De Anima a25 is introducing tripartition in contrast with bipartition, the Topics passage appears to be dealing with a bipartite version of tripartition.
On a10—16 and bipartition see Dirlmeier, Magna Moralia above, note 14 ; on tripartition in the Topics, see v. Arnim, above, note The other two psychic parts are mortal and are located in the trunk of the body. For our purposes the important point is that the Timaeus not only employs this bipartite version of tripartition but also attempts to handle sense perception. The account of tastes is particularly perplexing.
It is not explicitly said that the veins terminate at the heart, and so the possibility is left open that the veins continue on to the brain. Taylor above, note 24 , assumes some kind of connection between the heart and the brain. Further, pungent tastes are associated with particles that rise toward the senses or sense organs in the head 65E7 and so seem to have little connection with the veins extending to the heart.
And we may suspect that when Aristotle criticizes bipartition for its inability to handle sensation, he is thinking of bipartition much as it appears in the Timaeus. See Solmsen above, note 25 See Ross, op. Certainly the objection to spatially separated parts a20 is directed most naturally against a version of bipartition or tripartition like that advanced in the Timaeus. We might expect Aristotle to name Timaios as at b It is also and primarily a matter of how Aristotle conceives of the dichotomy of bipartition. For Aristotle the dichotomy of bipartition is primarily a dichotomy between reasoned deliberation and emotional response.
Practical wisdom, which is the virtue of the logical soul, is a perfection of deliberation. All emotion is located in the alogical soul. This is not true of tripartition and we may add the bipartite version of tripartition. See Dirlmeier, Nikomachische Ethik above, note 14 Gauthier and Jolif above, note 14 2. Whether or not we follow v. Each enjoys not only a cognitive aspect but also a desiderative and emotional aspect. Of course, reasoning can direct or alter desires and emotions, but it is distinct.
That question arises only when bipartition is conceived of as a simple variant of tripartition. In a recently published issue of this journal,1 Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp has discussed the twofold division of the soul in Nicomachean Ethics 1. Ingenkamp is correct that the account in question divides in two: b13—a1 and a1—3. I question only whether his explanation has gone far enough. More than a century ago, Bernays recognized that lines a1—3 are a supplement. His explanation is instructive: Earlier in 1.
Therefore at the end of 1. Nikomachische Ethik 3 Berlin-Darmstadt — I refer to chapter 7, following the OCT and the practice of most English speaking scholars, myself included. He wants to make clear how the bipartite psychology of ethical theory relates to the biological psychology of the De anima. For Aristotle has used the psychology of the De anima to determine the function of man. This use of the psychology of the De anima could be misleading, so that a listener or reader might confuse bipatition with the biological psychology.
For that reason, Aristotle has added a note, making clear that the division of bipartition runs within the biological faculty of thought; that the obedient part of the bipartite soul and the biological faculty of sensation are not identical. Emotions involve belief e. Aristotle has given an account of his own dichotomy using Platonic vocabulary,8 and as earlier in 1. This short note recalls the earlier note in this regard Bernays is correct See, e.
For this middle level is that of sensation. We may conclude that the lines b13—a3 are not continuous. The lines a1—3 were added by Aristotle, but not as a mere possibility. Rather, the three lines recall a4—5 and help the listener to distinguish between the dichotomy of ethical theory and the biological psychology of the De anima. The two are not identical and cannot be confused without a string of absurdities arising. Aristotle understands this, and in 1. In his discussion of Nicomachean Ethics 1. We may compare De anima 3. In an ethical context, it most often refers to the rational part of the bipartite 6 7.
Fortenbaugh above, note 2 Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle London vol. Hicks, Aristotle, De Anima London Vernunft seems to refer to the rational part of the bipartite soul. Regarding Nicomachean Ethics 1. The consequences of such a belief would be absurd. The sphere of moral virtue would be the biological faculties of desire and sensation, and the habituation that brings moral virtue to perfection cf.
Fourthly, I shall defend the thesis that, when ascertaining the type of philosophy the philosophy of law is —or should be—, the most decisive factor is not so much or not only the relationship between philosophy of law and philosophy in general as, more importantly, the relationship between it and law itself Sec. The fundamental ideas of the philosophy of law are thus values, in the sense of practical ideas Sec. Hence, legal philosophical discourse has to remain close to the practice of law and is necessary for it. This approach allows us to go beyond the dichotomy between natural law that claims that values constitute the ultimate underpinning of law, but in the sense of a dogmatic or metaphysical philosophy and legal positivism defined by evaluative distance and neutrality regarding law, but in a sceptical or relativistic sense, postulated more as a scientific than as a strictly philosophical discourse of law.
Concepts are inherent to the sciences in a broad sense, including technical fields , while ideas are the very stuff of philosophy. However, the totalisation and universality of ideas is not the same as, and cannot be reduced to the totalisation of concepts. Philosophical problems abide by their own format: they are neither technical nor scientific problems, but rather emerge directly or spring up at the same time as technical or scientific problems, representing a second degree of reflexivity.
Scientific concepts including techniques and technologies would be universal relative to or within each of these categorical domains, filtering out everything that is conceptually irrelevant, or external to them. However, for this very reason, everything that can be said rationally about each category individually or about all of them together i. Thus, at the very least, questions such as the relationships between these diverse categories how many sciences there are and how they differ among each other , their scope how far the universality of each science stretches and their validity what it means to consider a given scientific knowledge universally grounded could no longer be resolved from inside the categories themselves, as they do not constitute scientific or technical problems to be analysed using their own conceptual instruments.
On the contrary, they require a different kind of rational treatment, a totalisation of a different type, one that is also universalist. And this, precisely, is what philosophical discourse is. Philosophical theories are therefore nothing other than more or less systematic elaborations and interpretations of these ideas throughout their historical development. They thus reflect problems which have been sparked repeatedly by the concepts of the sciences, yet they resist being equated with or reduced to mere scientific or technical problems.
As they involve ideas and not only concepts, philosophical problems truly have their own format. They are not resolved by the sciences or techniques but instead reframed by them hence their historical persistence. A philosophical problem is characterised primarily by the fact that it questions an entire category as a whole, and does so in a particular way, connecting it to others and inquiring into its foundations and validity. This is what happens, for example, with epistemological and ontological questions, which question how categories represent or conceptualise the world and how the world is represented or conceptualised by them.
The answer to this requires a kind of totalising reflection which encompasses criticism —that is analysis, comparison, classification, setting limits— of the scientific concepts themselves according to more or less systematic general conceptions which deal with epistemological ideas a certain theory of science or of knowledge and ontological ideas a certain theory of the elements which make up the real. Therefore, legal philosophy may claim to be a totalising knowledge inasmuch as its points of departure and arrival are these other knowledges and practices Atienza 5.
Ever since philosophy of law emerged as a new discipline in the contemporary era —replacing natural law, which was, in fact, legal philosophy— it has been cultivated almost exclusively in law faculties instead of in philosophy faculties. That is, its main practitioners are jurists. However, it is true that legal philosophers have continued to draw from general philosophies, both current and past thus, Kelsen cannot be understood without Kant, Hart without Wittgenstein, Finnis without Thomas Aquinas, Alexy without Habermas, hermeneutics without Gadamer , which nonetheless are given a new and different dimension, driven by a reflexive interest in the law and in developments in legal practice thus, Kelsen has said much more about legal duty than the neo-Kantians, and the same holds true of Hart compared to Wittgenstein on legal rules, and Alexy on the theory of legal discourse compared to Habermas.
It is primarily couched in truly controversial terms because of the fact that, after the decline of natural law, the entrenchment of legal positivism as a core, dominant vein in contemporary legal thinking went hand-in-hand with a parallel tendency to liquidate the substantive aspect of philosophy a feature it shares with both general 19 th -century positivism and neo-positivism.
This situation could be compared, mutatis mutandis , to that which entails simply admitting that the philosophy of religion only makes sense when made by, and when serving, the adepts or theologians of a given denomination. Not just any discourse about law can genuinely be called philosophical, even if it bears this name, nor can all philosophical discourse about law be labelled dispensable or dogmatic as such.
The contrast that Bobbio formulated is actually based on a false dilemma. These ideas would essentially be of two kinds: epistemological and ontological. Thus, the philosophical method is one and the same regardless of whether it is practised by jurists or philosophers and can only consist of this twofold movement which starts from the categorical concepts or the problems caused by them, which we shall discuss below , analyses them in terms of second-order ideas or concepts, and then returns back to them to offer a new synthesis or re-composition in light of a conception that forges relevant inter-categorical relationships among them.
Thus, if these are the two methodological or dialectical moments of philosophical rationality — regressus and progresssus — it is simply because the categorical concepts can be analysed either according to the relationships among each category and the kind of knowledge or conceptualisation that fit within them the kinds of knowledge, studies, sciences, etc. Put more simply and applied to the matter at hand: legal philosophy devises a map of legal knowledge and realities. This would be the error of a dogmatic aprioristic or metaphysical conception of philosophy, as Bobbio correctly pointed out.
Indeed, the presence of the same method of rationalising legal phenomena following a two-way path between the categories or concepts of law and certain philosophical ideas has been in constant practice in legal philosophy ever since ancient Greece. Even though in the Natural Law, Kantian and Hegelian traditions, this has tended to be limited to a single idea, i.
We could claim that the inner structure of these concepts is already constituted by philosophical ideas. This is a very important aspect of what it means to be a practical philosophy. Both the philosophical methods and the objective ideas with which it works have taken on different meanings in law through the very evolution of legal forms.
Philosophy of law has always kept in line with the historical development of legal phenomena. This is how the historical relationships between Roman law and mediaeval ius commune or common law and Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy can be interpreted. Another illustration of this common evolution is the relationship between rational legal philosophy and Enlightenment philosophy with regard to the historical process of State formation, and the positivisation of modern national law. Thus, paraphrasing Hegel, legal philosophy could be defined as a legal era captured in thinking, that is, in ideas, beginning with the very general conception of law, which should then not be a concept but rather a philosophical idea.
This is a consequence of understanding that the ideas we are discussing exist within the historical and social process unlike any aprioristical metaphysics , and that they do not belong to an ideal topos uranos nor yet are they mere ideologies associated with groups or classes. Changes in the legal realities are what lead to philosophical ideas which, in turn, allow us to better reconstruct and understand those changes and influence them by means of new ideas.
For this reason, before answering the questions of how the philosophy is applied to law or to what purpose , we must question why this application is needed: why the law needs to incorporate any philosophical reflection, whether it comes from jurists or philosophers. It would be difficult to find a view of law that denied that this categorical nature is essentially practical, inasmuch as it is an institutionalised social technique. The categoricity of law is also associated with its normativity. Legal institutions legislative, judicial, executive consist of linked practices aimed at continuously producing and applying norms.
They are also second-order practices in that legal institutional operations have a social anchor: they assume given practices and norms, and their purpose is to establish a certain order with regard to these practices and norms, interfering in their course by means of operations and decisions. The institutional structure of law is thus situated in a middle ground between moral institutions and political institutions. The legal norms that result from this practical institutional structure are viewed as the ultimate social norms —that is, final or definitive, not of course morally infallible norms.
Atienza —2 boils this idea down to its essence:. The role of the philosophy of law in legal culture as a whole is similar to that performed by law in society overall. The law is said to be a system of social control because it oversees and somehow directs the way social institutions operate; the juridical is not an attribute exclusive to certain social sectors or institutions but rather —once again using C. Nor does the philosophy of law have a bounded, exclusive terrain within all legal and social knowledge; its terrain is instead to be found in the relationships among these diverse sectors of culture.
Such universal elements — which, as we shall see, are simply values— are the necessary components of legal rationality, of the very discourse of law, and they make its concepts characteristically extend beyond the categorical framework from which they emerged. Totalisations are common to any category, just as any scientific or technical category entails exercising criticism at some level.
As we have already said, the uniquely philosophical form of totalisation appears in a multi-categorical and therefore transcendental context. And this holds true of legal concepts inasmuch as their practical and normative nature implies connection and synthesis among different categories: moral, political, social, economic, etc. The kind of normative totalisation which is characteristic of the legal category brings it to the verge of philosophy. Additionally, we should not lose sight of the fact that the very origins of philosophy in Greece were closely tied to discussions of all sorts of problems —logical, moral, political, etc.
Because it is institutionalised, the law is a collective practice, an aggregate of extraordinarily complex and highly internal specialised sub-institutions —at least where legislative, executive and judicial functions can be minimally differentiated— which operate according to decisions of diverse subjects through extensive periods of time.
This multiple diversity of functional parts means that unity and coherence of purposes within legal practice are only possible if it incorporates specific devices of reflective rationalisation to carry out its functions of producing and applying norms. Legal practice depends on a complex conceptual and theoretical instrumentarium in which we can discern two different genres. The second genre contains the material theories which supply overarching conceptions of the substantive normative contents , the purposes and values which the legal system is geared towards achieving via the aforementioned techniques and methods e.
I am referring to the fact that it has a dialectical constituent nature; that is, it is structurally associated with conflict, deviation, incompatibility, contradiction, incommensurability and controversy. Therefore, its rationality essentially consists of deploying strategies aimed at using discourse and argumentation to manage and disentangle these conflicts and incommensurabilities. There is no need to belabour the fact that this is also true of both producing laws legislative, constitutional and applying them judicial, administrative.
The logical construction of kinds or types of action and the individualisation and specification of the particular practical situations arising from them are a form of totalisation, and the same holds true of the finalistic reasoning composition of interests and objectives and balancing deliberation composition of values from which legal norms and decisions result. In both cases, the practical problems that are addressed by the law are therefore very similar to philosophical problems. Furthermore, this systematisation cannot merely be logical or formal.
Given that the law is a second-order system, these elements cannot be anything other than the overarching purposes and values that the legal system strives to materialise in the first-order social practices, purposes and values that the law itself does not create but rather recreates and shapes in practical terms. Theoretical conceptions usually considered to belong to academic philosophy of law legal positivism, formalism, natural law, constitutionalism, realism, etc. Therefore, the point of contact between legal philosophy as a discipline and law itself is to be found here: philosophical conceptions of law are an internal part of its practice, and the theories that shape legal practice partly overlap with the philosophy of law.
This contrast distorts the fact that any philosophy of law, no matter whose it is, has always consisted in applying more or less systematic philosophical schemes to law and it is impossible to see how it could be otherwise. On the one hand, Bobbio does not pay enough attention to the fact that law is a historical-cultural institution which poses general philosophical problems for any philosophy.
However, this in no way guarantees complete immunity from metaphysics or dogmatism. In any historical period, jurists have appropriated general philosophies when devising their doctrines indeed, the very category of legal has always needed a covering of philosophy with which to build its internal meta-theory.
These conceptions are unquestionably the best available philosophical entryway into the law, in that they supply the basic repertoire of legal-philosophical ideas and, in this sense, must be capable of being incorporated by any philosophy of law that does not seek to be metaphysical or disconnected from legal experience. Yet they must also be the target of criticism and reframing in general or transcendental philosophical terms, rather than being viewed as inherent to a purely endo-legal or intra-categorical discourse. And that criticism means that legal philosophy must necessarily interweave with moral philosophy and political philosophy; that is, it must be constructed within the framework of some practical general conception of philosophy viewed in a transcendental perspective.
Below we shall very schematically examine some of the main arguments upholding this claim. They are essentially justificative totalisations. Given that the law is a practical, normative category, legal concepts are doctrinal concepts. Legal concepts are linked to the practice of arguing and providing reasons in regard to legal decisions, of justifying action ex post and ex ante. Hence, it is essential to gain some conception of the principles which are the normative expression of values and to wholesale reconstruct the law involved in the resolution of each case in legal practice, even if this may only seem particularly visible in difficult cases or in legal issues that typically spark moral disagreements abortion, euthanasia, gay marriage, surrogate motherhood, etc.
All legal issues, including easy cases, are questions of principle in this sense, that is, questions of value. That is, it is resolved in what, we have called since Aristotle, 25 justice as a basic schema to articulate ideas around what is good and right in distribution and reparation in both the public and private matters that make up the territorium of human praxis.
In this way, the justificative dimension of law connects it internally , from its own practice, to philosophical-moral and philosophical-political conceptions. It leads to general or omni-comprehensive systems of practical philosophy with an orientation that can be liberal, utilitarian, communitarian, deontological, social, etc. These normative functions essentially correspond to the academic philosophy of law, the natural middle ground between law and practical philosophy, which is then shown to be a practical undertaking.
The philosophy of law is a practical philosophy that follows the law, like its shadow. The values it encompasses, as both transcendental underpinnings and ideas from practical philosophy simultaneously, serve as a bridge, allowing a back and forth movement between the two. After all, law is not only a place where political-moral values are realised and embodied a decisively effective embodiment due to the fact that legal institutionalisation manages public coercion and where these values thus gain a definitive justification, but also the place where moral philosophy and political philosophy converge on equal terms from their own transcendental perspectives.
Indeed, legal-practical institutions appear to be their necessary landing place. They can play the role of a historical-cultural mesh necessary to make morality and political society possible, without which their values would simply disintegrate. It essentially has to do with the justificative purpose of law, which operates on the basis of practical values. The point is not only the prevalence of this justificative dimension of law over its technical or directive dimension, since the problems it deals with encompass conflicts and disagreements that are ultimately axiological and need to be resolved on equal terms.
The point is also, and above all, that this requires going beyond the legal category to reveal law as a precisely political-moral technique. Legal technique as a whole and each of the decisions made within it throughout its constant development in this second reflective level on social practices must appear as a justified practice that serves the values of justice and morality. The essentially totalising and conflicting nature of the practical values involved in the legal institution —the values of justice or, more accurately, the demands of injustice 28 — are what make the concept of law draw from philosophy, and what makes legal philosophy a practical philosophy.