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Link Either by signing into your account or linking your membership details before your order is placed. Description Table of Contents Product Details Click on the cover image above to read some pages of this book! The book includes a Foreword written by Bruce Schneier. Industry Reviews When it comes to documenting the history of cryptography, David Kahn is singularly one of the finest, if not the finest writers in that domain.
A review of Robert B. Pearl Harbor and the Inadequacy of Intelligence The American solution of Japanese codes didn't prevent the attack because no intercepts warned of it. Prejudices did. Officials overestimated Germany and underestimated Japan. No traces survive, however, of how he used it in running the war. Edward Bell and His Zimmermann Telegram Memoranda Biographical details and a photograph of the American diplomat who handled history's most important decrypt in London, plus his unpublished memoranda about it.
Bell was a close college friend of Franklin D.
Read How I Discovered World War II's Greatest Spy and Other Stories of Intelligence and Code
Cryptography and the Origins of Spread Spectrum How a transatlantic telephone system encrypted with one-time keys was used by Roosevelt and Churchill. Film star Hedy Lamarr helped create a vocoder used in the cryptosystem. But only after radio interception gave intelligence speed and accuracy in the 20th century did it help win wars.
- World War II — Central Intelligence Agency.
- Making Europe: People, Politics, and Culture, Volume 2: Since 1550;
- Secrecy and firing squads: Britain’s ruthless war on Nazi spies | World news | The Guardian!
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- Are Spies More Trouble Than They’re Worth? | The New Yorker.
- Aguecheeks Beef, Belchs Hiccup, and Other Gastronomic Interjections: Literature, Culture, and Food Among the Early Moderns.
An Enigma Chronology The dates of key captures of documents, setbacks in solution, and breakthroughs. Soviet COMINT in the Cold War Soviet communications intelligence came more from bugs and traitors than from cryptanalysis; some details of its organization, based on interviews with a former chief and workers. Clausewitz on Intelligence Why the great theoretician disdained intelligence and why generals accept it now.
Surprise and Secrecy: Two Thoughts Secrecy can be quantified as Shannon quantified information; surprise is a matter not of insufficient information but of insufficient time. Intelligence Lessons in Macbeth How the usurping king dealt with predictions and intelligence he did not like -- a situation that faces all leaders. When Garbles Tickled History Mistakes in transmission or coding and their effects.
The Cryptologic Origin of Braille Louis Braille got his idea from a secret communications system devised by a French officer. Mostly they don't. It is too dangerous. In this case, the technique was abandoned after one message. The Prehistory of the General Staff It came into being after three preconditions emerged: secularization, bureaucracy, and management. Mendelsohn and Why I Envy Him A biographical sketch of the first scholarly historian of cryptology and collector of the most antiquarian books in the field.
The Man in the Iron Mask An examination of the nomenclators of Louis XIV shows none with the term masque, showing that the solution proposed by the great 19th-century French cryptanalyst Etienne Bazeries of the mysterious prisoner's identity is probably wrong.
The History Press | Espionage and the SOE
Plus a listing of other French nomenclators. The universal law of unintended consequences rules with a special ferocity in espionage and covert action, because pervasive secrecy rules out the small, mid-course corrections that are possible in normal social pursuits. Good and bad intelligence circle round and round, until both go down the drain of sense.
Others are tragic. But it turns out that the upper reaches of the C. But his special contribution to American culture was introducing it to LSD; at one point, he bought up the entire supply produced by the Sandoz company, in Switzerland. He used it on often unwitting subjects, including prisoners and students, to see if it could induce a mental state extreme enough to work as either a kind of truth serum or a mind-control agent.
It did neither successfully. It is also frightening to read, since it documents the significant sums our government spent on spy schemes as tawdry as they were ridiculous, not to mention spasmodically cruel and even murderous. At least one C. Even weirder, Gottlieb hired an eccentric cop, George Hunter White, to be a chief operative. The C.
Later, White took his act to San Francisco, where he expanded his research to include observing the effects of LSD on prostitutes and their clients during sex—the C. Your tax dollars at work. What might be a rational goal of such a research project—to identify forms of interrogation that would not require the slow and brutal uncertainties of torture, or the unreliability of sexual bribes—was never seriously pursued.
Many of the LSD experiments were administered in harsh, isolated environments, without warning and in ways that would induce extreme panic. By secretly subcontracting LSD-related experiments throughout American academia, Gottlieb inadvertently seeded the great wave of psychedelia in which half of young America turned on, tuned in, and dropped out.
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Then it spread to students who took it in CIA-sponsored experiments. Finally it exploded into the American counterculture, fueling a movement dedicated to destroying much of what the CIA defended and held dear. Everything is the opposite of what it is. This story, like most monocausal stories, is probably too neat. LSD was used as a weapon in the fifties, but it was also used openly at the same time as a therapy for alcoholism; the relation of the C.
The oddity is that Gottlieb and his circle saw acid as causing breakdowns and psychosis—and, indeed, their stealthy experiments produced such symptoms, even in the relatively benign premises of the Village and North Beach. M, of course, has anticipated the attack, and installed a descending shield in the ceiling above his desk. That none of this was real did not make it less emotionally credible. The theory held that the agency had long been penetrated by a high-ranking mole and that the K. A truly fascinating man, Angleton was a devoted student of the matchless British literary critic William Empson, who descried, in the densely metaphoric poems of Donne and Shakespeare, patterns of subtle contradiction, self-reference, and ambiguity.
Angleton had, in effect, weaponized this strategy of interpretation—convinced that any apparently straightforward reference in the world in fact meant something shadowier than it seemed to.
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A dose of acid was the last thing this kind of highbrow paranoia needed. An older and overlooked book raises similar questions about the intelligence of national intelligence. Their triumph, somewhat lessened by the reality that Ames had been doing pretty much everything short of wearing a nametag written in Russian, is made more touching because of the bureaucratic obstacles they had to overcome at each turn.
Among them was the way female agents were almost always relegated to less important tasks, and were handed this urgent one largely as an afterthought. Their account, more a document than a book, shows a purely civil-service mind-set intersecting with what seems like extraordinarily high stakes: the discovery of the ultimate mole.
Competition with the F. And how underpaid the people who are entrusted with national security are! Ames, who started spying for Russia in the mid-eighties, typically received sums of between twenty thousand and fifty thousand dollars for delivering information, and was seen as wildly greedy, this at a time when traders at Drexel Burnham Lambert were making millions a year. A giveaway of his guilt came when one of the C.
Only a Russian spy would have that kind of dough! Grimes and Vertefeuille make plain the extent to which internal C. Meanwhile, the C. Such dispatches, Grimes and Vertefeuille say, provided a thrillingly complete picture of what the K. But knowing exactly what the other paper is doing is not at all the same thing as actually beating the other paper to the news. Knowing what the K. You could have arrived at better judgment about what was going on in Russia by reading the newspapers, it seems, than by working for the C.
The conclusions that the intelligence services reached in the crucial period of the late eighties tended to be wildly wrong—as with the widely shared belief that Gorbachev was part of a ploy to put America off its guard—or bizarrely skewed by politics. Ronald Reagan was outraged by a supposed Russian plot to plant mini bombs in West Germany, and his C. The K. Angleton, had he lived to see it, might at least have been impressed to learn that the text of the Cold War, although not as ambiguous as he had supposed, truly was—another favorite term of his beloved Empson—ironic.
In court, Ames countered that his fellow American spies spent their days cajoling, or blackmailing, Russians into selling out their colleagues. Ames never changed his ideology; he merely added another checking account. His real sin, from this perspective, was not betraying his colleagues but betraying the Russians whom his colleagues had persuaded to betray their colleagues. Which leads us to the final paradox of paranoia. Espionage and intelligence are so conducive to mistrust that the people who make the best use of them tend to be the most equable and disinclined to suspicion.