The army is still equipped with Mastiff vehicles, bought to protect troops from road-side bombs in Afghanistan. T he researchers accept is is a significant challenge for the Strike Brigades to find a way of evolving the army from the structures and equipment necessary for counter insurgency operations, back to modern war fighting. The paper suggests that failing to be seen by Russia as a credible deterrent makes a provocation, probably in the Baltic states, more likely. We urge you to turn off your ad blocker for The Telegraph website so that you can continue to access our quality content in the future.
Visit our adblocking instructions page. Telegraph News. If a full bird colonel can't think, then who can and when does this happen? My friend is inflexible because he is a " true blue " believer that the DoD structure is highly successful and this formula must not be deviated from. At this point, I decided not to attack this underlying, inherent, nation-states-can-only-do-organized-violence foolishness with the case that we actually need more eastern Sun Tzu style military thought to combat eastern sub-national conflict and nation-state enemies incorporating unusual small group techniques because I wanted to explore more of his thinking to get an " inside view " of the senior joint colonel.
I bit my tongue a bit. I decided to be honest though, and told him up front, that I don't see the need to learn this " joint language " since its obvious from common sense that its not working. He said Congress uses this jointspeak. I asked; " where did they learn it? Did someone use it to bamboozle them better? Nevertheless, we continued with him railing on me to understand DoD's joint " doctrine " on their terms and to stop using my own common sense derived from observing the facts-on-the-ground or else I will continue to be persona non grata in DoD circles.
I replied that I'm always willing to somewhat " play the game " better if it will help, but I will not lose my connection to reality to do it. However, he had an agenda beyond me just having better language skills to relate my reform ideas to DoDhe wanted me to somehow sans the facts all around us actually see the " success " that DoD's doctrine has created. I was aghast. We are having our asses handed to us in Iraq " was my honest reply.
At this point, he was ready to answer such criticism with a ready-made answer, and in my case as a fellow but junior officer not on the inside or in power, he decided to play the " I've got-a-secret-you-don't-know-because-I'm-in-and-you-are-not " game. We did exactly as we set out to do. I replied not sarcasticallythough temptedbut critically; " You mean regime change into chaos? Mon frere. Read the OPLAN " ie; only we know the real facts and we will not let you read them, so stop criticizing; we didn't fail AKA argument-by-assertion doesn't need proofs from reality.
At this point, now I have conflicting information. Maybe that's all he can do at this point is to prop up the failed status quo is to create a shadow of doubt? A best-selling book by a retired marine general and New York Times reporter both privy to inside information and this older senior officer trying to keep a younger junior one " in-line " over the phone with statements that there really is a " Wizard of Oz " logic behind those " pulling the cords " behind the " curtains " in the " emerald city ".
Have faith. The great pumpkin will come. I decided to let this issue go and proceeded to the next glaring, obvious failure in Iraq. He replied bitterly: "No, we had a force cap, we didn't have the forces to clear everything out. The 4th ID's equipment were sitting in cargo ships doing nothing. We could have taken some of those tankers people and flown them into the northern airfield the rd Airborne had taken to be a task force to take up a position between Tikrit and Baghdad to block Saddam's escape route.
With a prejudice-created, heavy tanker mental block that justifiably hates the Airborne mentality which usually lies to itself that it doesn't need ANY tanks at all not even light ones, he like many others throws the baby out with the bath water and proceeded to create a can't-do construct by declaring that if we can't airlift his big brigades and battalions then this force option was not possible.
If you can't do it his way, he cannot even conceive of it any other way. His reply was first to try to deflate my argument by finding some personal ignorance on my part of how big the 4th ID is even though I wasn't advocating flying the whole division in, just enough to block some thugs in pick-up trucks and SUVs from fleeing the capital city. He switched back into ad hominum mode: " How many M1s are in the 4th ID? We got Noriega in ' If they don't grow up in the " Airborne mafia " they are not going to know what's possible by USAF or any other aircraft type to effect 3D maneuver.
It doesn't want to be corrected. In this case, we have unimaginative senior military officers wanting to do only the bare bone minimums to get by using the FIDO set before them by the National Command Authorities NCA and even then to have built-in DoDspeak " wiggle room " to excuse away any failures. The facts are the 4th ID M is on its ass and should have continually trained for years before OIF to fly with USAF Cs to generate 3D maneuver task forces so they didn't have to sit the war out when sealift couldn't get them there.
They didn't have this ready, because of their heavy tanker prejudices are not interested in Airborne operations using the excuse; " Its not my job, man ". The Army culture itself is driven by its own narrow-minded facts-of-the-situation ignorance and doesn't want anyone to leave their social place and role, either and doesn't challenge units like the 4th ID to " air-mech ". That's why we wrote a whole book on the subject www. Airborne lightfighters want to foot slog at 1 mph or ride around in sexy " rat patrol " trucks that cannot stand alone and block those determined to get through too light and the heavy tankers that can block want instead to play George S.
Patton stampeding thousands of armored vehicles over favorable open terrain and not take any personal death risks flying in an airplane to get the situational high ground before the enemy can escape too heavy and there is no " middle option " for either of them lest they admit to shortcomings in their extreme mentalities. Army and marines. Check-mated by the facts, my senior officer fell back onto his last line of defense: hair-splitting the OIF OPLAN verbage, he screamed into his telephone mouthpiece: "What was the mission????!!!
He was the strongman holding the violently opposed factions together, yet all we wanted to do is evict him from offices and palaces in Baghdad and we were not concerned if he would escape and roam about leading a rebellion? This only makes sense if dark, sinister forces are the real driving forces in American foreign policy and they deliberately wanted Iraq to degenerate into chaos first against Americans refusing to get public works going, and then amongst themselves so as to bleed American stuck occupying Iraq indefinitely and harm it. The fact is we have thousands of colonels in the U.
We are still operating under the post-WW2 construct of OPMS whose goal is to shuffle officers around to a lot of different jobs to hopefully give them a broad view of warfare and in the end make lots of Colonels into good generalists to be cadre for a WWIII mobilization and expansion into divisions from the current The result is we have thousands of colonels in a " holding pattern " waiting for the call to self-validation into general officer rank with nothing to do, so we make them go to joint schools and write joint " doctrine " ie; talk about talking about how we would do things if we could.
Until then, our too-many-chiefs-not-enough-Indians, DoDwonks order you that you must buy into their fantasy world and its terminology and accept their built-in excuses that go along with their verbiage or else you will never see the " Wizard ", much less be the " Wizard " join the general officer's clubhouse. My experience verbally clashing with the status quo gatekeeper did not overthrow the facts-on-the-ground that can be viewed with common sense.
It did show, how that senior brass are by choice, out-of-touch-with-reality because they don't want the American citizen to be able to employ common sense and view military operations and expect RESULTS. They certainly don't want subordinates aware that they are naked emperors , they need these folks to fawn over them to provide narcissistic supply. By using mythical terminology so military practice is somehow made into an unknowable " black art " that only insiders know, they can insulate themselves from responsibility CYA to get positive results with America's blood and treasure.
If you don't use their terminology and accept their built-in excuses they can play a verbal " gotya! This explains why Humvee and Stryker trucks are constantly blown up and DoD sees no problem with continuing to use them. They are trapped in their own language, terminology and built-in failed ideas.
Outcome C is both immoral and incompetent. Sounds like an alcoholic who can't give up the bottle, doesn't it? Good Men who mean well? Says Who? In closing, my friend said we are inherently wrong in all our web pages www. They are above the law. They are a law unto themselves. He can take their DoDspeak and lying doctrinal BS and " go to hell " as far as we are concerned and that's actually where they are headed as a matter of fact. I will say that my friend means well and this is an exception.
But is he good? I'd say not. An idea of smug superiority that says: "I don't want the American civilian citizen questioning what I'm doing, in fact, I don't want my junior partners doing it either. If they want to rise to the top of this outfit, they better damn well buy into the rules of the schoolyard and use our terminology and our inherent escape clauses for excusing away military failures.
You missed, so try again. Find out how you missed and maybe next time you will hit? However, by propping up weak egos so they never have to admit to failure by internal self-delusional language, we deny the ability to admit and understand mistakes so we can change and adapt to be genuinely successful so there is no doubt in anyone's mindfriend or foe alikethat we have the victory.
If we have to " spin " victory it ain't victory. Narcissism is not good, its an ugly evil of the worse kind. It also has a direct causative relationship to military incompetence, which is why I no longer present good military ideas of weaponry or tactics anymore as a " morality-free lunch ". I am not a genius, there are plenty of smarter people than me out there and if their ideas are not being used in U. I also do not think careerist military narcissism just happens suddenly at the rank of Major when an officer has passed from " summer help " to a possible ride to general officer's stars and " immortality " of remembrance passed on by successive generations of temporal human beings all of whom will biologically die unless God himself returns in actual space-time history.
It is at this rank that the careerist behavior begins to manifest itself openly and shamelessly. Narcissism is the fundamental, existentialist secular base of the U. I don't care who gets the credit for good ideas, I just want us all to win here as many times as possible and be successful here on our limited time on earth to grow in wisdom because in the final analysis, we are all going to die whether we are general officers or privates first class.
And what the Lord Jesus Christ is going to want from us before then, is that we understood we can never be perfect on our own power and have asked for a pardon from him. And from that moment forward, proceed to live our lives to help others unselfishly because all we have as human beings is indeed each other. We should drop the pretenses and airs of superiority we can temporarily play-act amongst ourselves so we can be completely and honestly connect to reality to co-operate fully with each other to get maximum greatest common denominator GCD synergistic effects through GIDO.
When Generals are not Generals "But you and we should say what we really think, and aim only at what is possible, for we both alike know that in the discussion of human affairs the question of justice only enters where there is equal power to enforce it, and that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must So much for the gods; we have told you why we expect to stand as high in their food opinion as you.
We can only have a just and competent military if those in power make it so; subordinates cannot rescue and overcome a fatally bad situational " hand " given to them as the new COIN manual FM tries to say otherwise to absolve generals from having good generalship to mastermind a winning situational construct. We don't have broad-minded Generals today, we have narrow-minded " shooters " in command of the services and overseas commands who create concepts of operation CONOPS or war formulas based on their narrow set of prejudices and experiences and its obvious to the entire world that we are not winning.
Landmines and car bombs are the most significant tools in play not KE bullets, yet " shooters " are in command. Is it a wonder why they haven't smothered the roadside bomb and car bomb? This is ludicrous. They were then protected from the petty abuses and gotya! Identifying who and who are not worthy of the fast track is a source for internal discontent but it can work, as the German military experience shows.
Whether its best for the American military is another question we will turn to shortly. When this doesn't happen, we get a glut of THOUSANDS of Colonels with nothing to do but write "doctrine" and more narrow-minded bureaucratic layers of rigmarole as they wait to get their nod to become a general or their walking papers.
The best way to see the better British model is to view their ethos in action in their recruiting videos: Light Infantry www. There will be no more underclass specialist branches, either. Combat Arms2D Combat Arms3D We are saying at the point where battalions are commanded and staffed, we expect the Combat Arms Majors to open their minds and start waging wars with all their means. To do this, we need more than lip service. There are 7 broad functional areas below. Assuming a 6 month school for each of the 6 areas he hasn't experienced, 3.
How well he then leads a battalion will determine if he is promoted to full Colonel and becomes a brigade commander. If he wants to be the best damn infantry officer at company level then he can and many should. However, we are NOT going to elevate to high commands any more narrow minded people who do not fully understand and exploit ALL battlefield operating systems. Never before has such lying military malpractice been foisted upon the general public as that emanates from the current crop of light infantry narcissists populating the U.
The appeal of the lightfighter is prevalent all throughout our popular culture; James Bond, Batman, and Rambo in the movies prevail over their many foes because their skill enables them to get close enough for a kill shot or to defeat them with hand-to-hand combat skills. We want to have romantic heroes like this and to get to play one in U.
The problem is that in real life, the enemy doesn't have to let you have a fair fight or get close enough to use short-range guns and combatives; the planet is still a very big place and he can unheroically rain down exploding shells or push the button to detonate a land mine as you try to cross distances. The reason is that a skilled, mechanized force will rain firepower on the light infantry and not even let it get close enough to employ their hand weapons as it slices the nation-state into pieces taking strategic ground without which the government loses control and basic power over resources and people.
There are really two armies in the U. Army; a light one that wants to fight too light on foot and from vulnerable wheeled trucks restricted to roads and a heavy one that wants to fight from too heavy tracked tanks that if firm open terrain is not available is restricted to roads. Both " mafias " are wrong and misunderstand and botch warfare in closed terrains where smart enemies hide in and operate from. As we approach foes hiding in closed terrains, they can rain down HE shells and guided missiles at us as the Israelis found out when they foot-slogged directly into Hezbo bunkers after air strikes failed to dislodge them.
The rise of the redneck, gunslinger lightfighter type who thinks he only has to mop up after air strikes to prominence in the U. The President of Georgia is a mirror image of a Dick Cheney Chickenhawk which is why Bush was so in love with him that he promised him the moon--if he'd naively deploy a couple thousand foot-slogger gunslinger narcissists to Iraq to help the corporate money-making enterprise there. When the professional Russian army came to take his country away from him, George Bush and his light infantry narcissists were nowhere to be found in the face of tank tracks, artillery shells and aircraft flying in direct, close air support of ground maneuvers.
Thank goodness the Russians have taught us a valuable lesson in professional military competence and equipment by trouncing these light infantry retards in Georgia. On the other hand, if an army gets too wed to its tanks and loses aggressiveness it could end up driving itself into proximity of light infantry to be effectively ambushed as we saw the Russian army do in Grozny in The Russians have learned this lesson; we have not.
We have half an U. Army that doesn't even have tracked APCs and no light tanks that is dependant upon the enemy blundering into their guns; if the enemy is smart and doesn't oblige like the Russians, we will get our asses handed to us.
Update: War in Afghanistan
What the U. These simple to-operate, cross-country mobile armored tanks can enable light infantry to fight a mobile style of warfare instead of waiting and hoping for a stupid enemy to appear magically into our gunslinging kill zones. We would also avoid appearing on roads for their land mines to work.
The Georgians were " beginning to walk, but by no means were they running ," said Army Capt.
Jeff Barta, who helped train a Georgian brigade for peacekeeping service in Iraq. The Americans arrived for work Aug. Then buses and trucks took the troops off toward Georgia's breakaway region of South Ossetia, where there had been sporadic clashes and shelling during the previous week. That night the Georgian army began an offensive trying to retake the Russian-supported region, and by the following morning hundreds of Russian tanks were rolling across the border.
The Georgian company commander who was training alongside Barta was killed.
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Trainers start with the basics of infantry warfare - shooting, taking cover, advancing - then on to squad and platoon maneuvers , Barta said. The Georgians do not lack " warrior spirit ," he said, but added that they weren't ready for combat. They inherited bad habits from the Red Army, whose Soldiers wouldn't move without a direct order from a superior, and need to be taught to think on their own, Barta said. To make things more difficult, many soldiers " come from the hills of Georgia, and some of them sign for their paycheck with an X ," he said. The Georgian army has five regular infantry brigades, each with some 2, troops.
Only one of them - the 1st, which was rushed home from Iraq by U. There are also units of poorly trained reservists, Georgian men who do 18 days of one-time military training and then eight days a year into their 40s. Officially, the government says it has 37, regular Soldiers and , reservists. Speaking on condition of anonymity, some of the American trainers spoke bluntly about problems with the Georgian troops, who one veteran sergeant said " got torn up real bad.
But when fighting broke out, the Georgians went back to the Soviet AK, the only weapon they trusted. They appeared incapable of firing single shots, instead letting off bursts of automatic fire, which is wildly inaccurate and wastes ammunition, he said. Another problem was communications: As soon as combat began, the army's communications network largely collapsed, he said, so troops conducted operations using regular cell phones. That left their communications easily accessible to Russian intelligence. The answer is no," the sergeant said. The U. Most have combat experience in Iraq or Afghanistan.
At the moment, according to the trainers, there are fewer than of them in the country. Officially their job is to get the Georgians ready to serve in Iraq, where the country has maintained a 2,man contingent. Unofficially, some of the trainers acknowledge, the program hopes to give the U.
The Americans aren't the only ones here. Georgian corporals and sergeants train with Germans, alpine units and the navy work with French instructors, and special operations and urban warfare troops are taught by Israelis, said Georgia's deputy defense minister, Batu Kutelia.
While the U. This former Soviet republic has allied itself with the West and has hopes of joining NATO, ambitions that Russia has seen as a challenge to its influence and security. Kutelia said Georgian troops who had trained with the Americans and other foreign forces - about half of the military - performed better in the war than those who didn't. It isn't clear how many Georgian units actually had a chance to put what they learned into practice. One Georgian officer who returned from the front said the army succumbed not to one-on-one combat but to overwhelming Russian air power.
The officer, who appeared shaken by what he saw, showed photographs of Georgian military jeeps destroyed from the air, the bodies of their occupants lying bloated on the road. He would not give his name because he was not authorized to speak to journalists. Barta, the Army captain, said of the company he was training: " I know specifically that Bravo Company, I'm sure, and I hope from what I did for them, that they're better off than they would have been if this happened four weeks ago.
Georgia declared a cease-fire too soon, he said, which demoralized the troops before most of them had a chance to fight. The Georgian army has been dealt a harsh blow: While official statistics claim fatalities, Soldiers and civilians, Liklikadze estimated the number of dead or missing Soldiers at Many Georgian military bases, including the main U. They seem eager to either get back to work or leave.
With the future of their mission uncertain, the trainers have been drafted to help the U. But it is hard to avoid the impression they would rather be elsewhere. Pongpat Piluek, a veteran of the Afghanistan war. By Frederick W. Kagan Frederick W. He held office at a moment of enormous danger. He had many admirable qualities necessary for success.
But like the tragic heroes of old, hubris and inflexibility made vices of his virtues, leading to his own fall and the collapse of his life's work. His experience in the same position under President Ford and as ambassador to NATO seemed to fit him to the task of overseeing a complex military coalition. His determination and self-confidence were essential in a wartime secretary - and unusual in recent times. When he showed, early in his tenure, that he meant to take positive control of the Pentagon's sprawling bureaucracy, many observers cheered.
This was precisely the sort of man the nation needed at the military's helm at a time of crisis. As former CIA Director Robert Gates prepares to succeed Rumsfeld, the chorus is already rising to declare that Gates must be more open to advice from the military, more of a consensus-builder than a tyrant. It isn't clear how a more open secretary of Defense would have fared given the advice the military gave Rumsfeld. Belief in the value of technology and the need for light, swift ground forces pervaded the senior military leadership in the s. Then-Army Chief of Staff Gen.
Eric Shinseki had launched an ambitious program to "lighten" the Army and equip it with advanced precision weapons. Shinseki certainly warned that more troops would be needed to secure Iraq in the wake of major combat operations. But Gen. Tommy Franks, the commander who developed and executed the actual war plan, wanted fewer. Many officers opposed the "light footprint" approach with which Rumsfeld tackled the problem of the Iraqi insurgency - but not Gen.
John Abizaid, who took over from Franks right after the end of major combat operations. A secretary of Defense who encouraged discussion and dissent would have perhaps anticipated more of the flaws in the policies he was proposing. Still, the strategy that has led to disaster in Iraq belonged to the commanders at least as much as to Rumsfeld. Scapegoating him in isolation will prevent us from learning the essential lessons of our recent failures. For the problem with Rumsfeld was not his flawed managerial style, but his flawed understanding of war.
Early in his term, he became captive of an idea. He would transform the U. He was not alone in his captivity. As a candidate, President Bush announced the same program in - long before anyone thought Don Rumsfeld would return as secretary of Defense. The program, quite simply, was to rely on information technology to permit American forces to locate, identify, track and destroy any target on the face of the Earth from thousands of miles away.
Ideally, ground forces would not be necessary in future wars. If they were, it would be in small numbers, widely dispersed, moving rapidly and engaging in little close combat. This vision defined U. Rumsfeld's advent hastened and solidified its triumph, but his departure will not lead instantly to its collapse. At its root, this "transformation program" is not a program for war at all. War is the use of force to achieve a political purpose, against a thinking enemy and involving human populations. Political aims cannot normally be achieved simply by destroying targets. But the transformation that enthusiasts of the s focused too narrowly on destroyed the enemy's military with small, lean and efficient forces.
This captivated Rumsfeld, becoming his passion. He meant it to be his legacy. It was the fatal flaw in this vision that led, in part, to the debacle in Iraq. Focused on destroying the enemy's military quickly and efficiently, Rumsfeld refused to consider the political complexities that would follow that destruction.
He and Franks pared the invasion force down to the smallest level that could defeat Saddam Hussein's army, but refused to consider the chaos that would follow the collapse of Hussein's government. This failure is inherent in the military thought of the s. Rumsfeld did not invent it. He simply executed it. Having made the mistake of failing to plan for achieving the political goals of the Iraq war, Rumsfeld then compounded his error. The war in Iraq threatened military transformation.
It was expensive and sucked scarce defense resources away from transformational programs. It was manpower-intensive and hindered Rumsfeld's efforts to reorient the military away from a focus on land power. It was intellectually distracting; counter-insurgency has little to do with transformation. Here Rumsfeld's virtues became his greatest vices.
Instead of recognizing the danger of losing Iraq, he remained committed to transforming the military to meet undefined future threats, spending billions of dollars preparing to fight Enemy X in He consistently opposed increasing the size of the ground forces, despite the obvious growing strains on the Army and the marines of repeated deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.
He fought to keep expensive weapons systems, such as the F fighter jet and the F Joint Strike Fighter, which were billed as "transformational" because they used precision-guided munitions to strike remote targets. That money could have been used for better armored vehicles, more body armor and more Soldiers. The same determination that had seemed so promising when he first took over became a stubborn refusal to change course in a storm. Rumsfeld has paid a high price for this failure. He will not be known as the secretary of Defense who transformed the military, but as the secretary of Defense who, at best, nearly lost the Iraq war.
Worse still, his stubbornness has destroyed the ground forces. The Army and marines have worn out their equipment and their troops. Units must swap tanks and Humvee s just to be able to train. The Army brass recently leaked the fact that only the units that are in Iraq or about to deploy to Iraq are combat-ready - an unprecedented military crisis. Rumsfeld leaves behind him a military far weaker and less capable than the one he took charge of in The greatest irony of all is that the military Rumsfeld has destroyed is the one he created.
He was secretary of Defense in the mids as the military was shifting from conscription to the all-volunteer force. He shepherded the volunteer military through its early growing pains and supported it valiantly against its many critics. Perfecting it through transformation was to be the culmination of his life's work. The damage he has done to it instead is his tragedy - and the nation's. Understanding the Great Mystery of High Explosives not for the weak hearted Once you have caught up on the history of High Explosives HE from the web page above, you will then be ready to consider the so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs" RMA and determine if its nothing more than a "transformation" sex change operation from male-to-female, making our military defective and weak.
We suggest you read the text below to describe how this is a wrong framework for understanding war and to see a more correct snapshot of what's really happening, then go to the power point slides to cover the same factual context again with pictures illustrating the points. This web site is composed of: 1. Planet Earth is planet earth. They want to focus on the latest gadgets to counter what human enemies are doing as if this was a science fair, they are in no position to prevail in the battle against man TBAM if TBATE is kicking them in the ass and diluting their military force effects.
This is not what is happening, we are spending more and more on mental means and physically getting weaker and weaker. To smother open terrain maneuver training for all incoming Armor branch officers, he has moved their school to Fort Benning, Georgia where its closed terrain covered in trees. He has placed the majority of the Army's budget into the mental problem avoidance and physically too light-for-open-terrain-and-too-heavy-for-closed-terrain-and-air transport Future Combat System FCS as a bone thrown the way of Army tracked units to deceive them into thinking they have a future when really FCS is too expensive and will be cancelled.
What Schoomaker's "mafia" wants is a simple 19th century Army like the Italian Army of WW2 with plenty of free time to do "From Here to Eternity" garrison games starting in the morning with sports PT so middle-aged men can think they are back on the high school track team and to create tired and sleep-deprived peons easily ordered around, wasting time showering and switching clothes, going to chow to eat cafeteria food 3 times a day , typing into desk and laptop computers perfect-paperwork-documenting-everything why?
When does anyone study war? They don't.
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Once in awhile when "resources are available", they will put a backpack on to march and find more Soldiers to berate for not "keeping up" and shoot and run around in the woods playing laser tag without combing arms realistically during "Field Training Exercises" FTXs. Near misses will not kill them. The Army's Modularity disorganization will make both light and heavy brigades physically weaker by taking their 3rd maneuver battalion which fights and making it into a Recon, Surveillance, Target Acquisition "RSTA squadron" that looks at the enemy and calls back mentally for some sort of firepower from someone else to handle the problem; a poor substitute for a fighting CAVALRY.
How Should the Army Reorganize? Army correctly, we'll call this the "Air-Mechanized" plan because it combines light tracked AFVs and aircraft to get the 3D maneuver capabilities we now lack. The Battle Against the Earth www. The Germans poured through and France fell within weeks and the British were forced from the continent.
Its raining in Afghanistan. Too bad wars don't take place where its comfortable and dry. Look at Me! I'm going 60 miles per hour on the road!! I drove into a rut Its the main bearing.
Armor of the Afghanistan War - PDF Free Download
Its broke, man. This thing won't run its trashed. Get through the dip! We are Stuck Again! It's Getting Dark! Let the Wheels Catch! Forget it. Cut the Engine! Maybe an officer will figure this out. Yeah, Right. We need to turn these pieces-of-shit in and get tracks so we can win " Paul Hornback's Wheels vs. Tracks Article in the March-April issue of U. They are liars and tactically inept because the truth is that LIGHT TRACKS like the M Gavin can go through and be flown over closed terrain by aircraft by virtue of their light weight and low ground pressure where their tracks meet the ground.
The Brits, Dutch and Canadians have re-learned this lesson, again. Light armored tracks are the ideal vehicles for light infantry if it wants to get the job done and stop worrying about how it will look vis-a-vis the rest of the Army or according to their prejudices. Their second lie is that they walk everywhere when in fact they are trucked and aircrafted from A to B, all the time.
They sleep in the trucks and have a "missing time" incident as if abducted by a demonic UFO. They like wheels because they can distort what is happening and say they walked and fought, trucks do not draw attention away from THEM. They are all actually motorized infantry. When the time comes to do nation-state war, if the terrain is open like in Iraq, the "light" units in trucks cannot be given their own independent maneuver objectives least they get creamed by enemy artillery, mortars, RPGs, ATGMs , and gunmen with automatic weapons This again is factually incorrect.
Are they wimps for boldly going into closed terrain to hit the very capable NVA enemy where he least expects it with superior shock action? No, they are in the process of kicking the enemy's ass with what works BEST. Without a fighting CAVALRY BRANCH to insure that light tanks are developed and those that use them in cavalry units and to support light infantry have a safe place to serve their country, those who fight in the main body in heavier tanks or in foot-slogging clusterfucks will foist all the money to themselves and not the force that has to be by definition be different and more mobile than them.
The military weak ego cannot tolerate someone higher-speed-than-thou. The generations of Soldiers thereafter, choked into not going off-road lest they infuriate an " eco-nazi " or uglify the post or worse get stuck in their too-heavy Bradley never learned what " right looks like " in cross-country, brush-breaking maneuver in M Gavin light tracks like the Vietnam war Soldiers did.
Their dismount infantry might have to.. They are going to sneak up on no one and get themselves killed against a capable foe. The following depicts how today's U. Army units look fighting the earth: As you can see, this is a fatal but fortunately fixable mess. Nearly ALL Army units can FLY over any given terrain with little airdrop to enormous effort airland onto runways , so this option wasn't listed.
Army has thousands of inexpensive to operate, simple-to-maintain and drive, Using band tracks, or rubber-padded steel tracks , M Gavin s can drive on paved roads without damaging them and go over 60 mph if the former track types are used. Fuel economy equivalent to a Humvee truck is possible by hybrid-electric drive. The "cat is out of the bag" to the entire world now on how to defeat U. The TBAM-only crowd sees war as a glorious manifestation of man's technological progress. He ignores the TBATE parameters and how they shape the fighting, he is only interested in the latest war fad the enemy is wearing.
Killing "ragheads" is not different than killing "gooks" in Vietnam; when gunslinger egomaniacs get involved they ignore TBATE and try to solve everything with gun play when there are other more effective forms of military force can be used to SMOTHER conflicts.
Terrain Ignored: How the U. Lost the Vietnam War, Part 1 of 3 www. Army combat veteran, Charlton Heston validates what we in the military reform movement have been documenting for years: that the U. The culprits here were the incompetent gun-ego marines who REFUSED to build McNamara's sensor line at the 17th parallel which would have been a start towards a winning strategy when ordered; the commandant and entire chain of command should have been court-martialed and if the USMC persisted in insubordination, the whole crumby, selfish, disloyal outfit disbanded.
Look who invaded Vietnam a few years after we left in ! Crisis Now Had FDR lived he would have insisted on Vietnamese unity and independence in at the end of WW2; Vietnam would have been our socialist, anti-communist " Yugoslavia " in the far east. France was too militarily weak to keep Vietnam so they should have instead accepted their independence and less lucrative oil and rubber profits--instead of no profits.
LTG Gavin was also the U. Lost the Vietnam War, Part 3 of 3 www. Now let's look at how fighting other men should be schematically arranged. Now let's superimpose a non-linear, nation-state war on top of terrain that is a combination of open and closed terrain types. If we fix both light and heavy units they can then contribute more to the fight by both 3D and 2D maneuver. Numbered SF groups are exempted because they are organized into man "A" teams not 9-man infantry squads, so its not feasible to mirror their MTOE to Army light units.
A 30mm autocannon used by AH Apaches on a stabilized mount with thermal sights would give light infantry for the first time an ability to fight on-the-move and have a decided edge over foes who have to stop to shoot accurately. Army Look Like? They lash out in all directions and round up thousands of folks in midnight dragnets because they are simply too full of themselves to restore stability and not create a rebellion against us from their heavy-handed ways: www.
Their garrison generals in garrison FOBs send them out on suicidal "presence patrols" as if its but a lawn care chore they can as former Iraqi commander General Ricardo Sanchez said; "go figure it out for themselves". We would have had a longer "honeymoon" period of support from the Iraqi people than the roughly 4 months we had. American Iraq War Casualties Report v1. Graphical breakdown of casualties. The list below is the names of the Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, Sailors and Coast Guardsmen whose families have been notified of their deaths by each country's government.
At least 9, U. The Pentagon does not report the number of non-hostile wounded. CAVEAT: USMC Headquarters does not admit to how its men were killed so many of these deaths are by roadside bombs and not the minimal assumption of bullets killing them which to their narcissistic minds appears more "heroic" because it implies the marine was fighting back compared to driving by a place on the road and getting blown up by the enemy pushing a button. Therefore we will factor in only the deaths we know about, known death causes. Where did they die? Don't let the weights of these thinly skinned trucks fool you--its composed primarily of drivetrains, suspensions and oversized box that has to fit on top of this conglomeration of fragile moving parts and 8 wheels with 8 air-filled rubber tires--NOT armor protective thickness.
Weighed down by these extra desperate pounds focused on narrow tires and fragile suspension, drivetrains and steering mechanisms, the Humvee s and LAVs are constantly breaking down requiring millions of dollars of on-scene civilian contractors to keep the battered trucks running.
The idea of buying new thinly armored trucks as a means to "transform" the force--be it Army or marineis simply tactically unsound and economically not feasible. How did they die? See death narratives coded ACC 8 killed due to constant need of replacing fragile rubber tires on numerous trucks; also driving skill incompetence due to lack of training in garrison. See death narratives coded ACC 10 killed due to being thrown or falling from from vehicle. See death narratives coded ACC 13 killed goofing off in former dictator palaces and swimming in rivers.
Garrison U. Drivers skills are negligible, when we actually "do it for real" in combat fatal accidents are sure to follow. Humvee s don't even carry a spare tire! The "run-flat will suffice" hubris plays into the overall wheeled Army laziness. The Army brass hope the Air Force will bomb the enemy into submission and their subordinates can then roll in on rubber tired SUVs bringing along their transplanted garrison Army daily routine, maybe picking off a "few bad apples" with their rifle for an otherwise uneventful occupation while receiving hazardous duty pay and earning a combat patch.
Clearing supply roads is a "rear area" dirty job for underclass MPs who drove around in Humvee s and do not physically occupy and cover every meter of the threatened roadsas infantry could do if assigned as pickets. In typical weak, co-dependant stay-in-you-lane behavior, those in the trucks simply try to speed as fast as they can to somehow evade a saboteur with a finger on a button that sets off an explosive charge at the speed of light.
While tracked AFVs are more robust in collisions due to their armored bodies and should be the minimum transportation standard on the non-linear battlefield NLB , the truth is that Soldiers cannot afford to ride in them while in seat belts and when they collide or turn over they are killed by being crushed or thrown from the sudden stop. We need to face this reality and develop a belt that has a safety cord at the rear that reels out so ther Soldier is not stuck to his seat so he can fight from his tracked AFV but stops reeling out in event of a sudden stop to secure the man from being thrown.
We also need to invest in infantry and armor actually securing our supply roads even if its not "sexy" and ego gratifying for the combat arms troops to do so. Interface with foreign civilians should be done by a Stability Corps of older, more mature Soldiers not youngsters trying to prove they are bad asses. Without supplies we cannot exist. Actual lives that could have been saved would no doubt be much higher. Details: www. Their demands for greater troop numbers was to hopefully put the Invasion of Iraq into the "too-hard-to-do" box.
They like large troop numbers because they are narcissist egomaniacs who want more power and people to order around as their servants. Less troops in a corrupt, lemming blind obedience outfit works only if enemies are weak and small Grenada , Panama etc. Against a large enemy over a large geographic area there will not be enough troops in the AVF to clear the enemy so he is only to our front and create "safe", "rear" areas for the support underclass to flourish.
Bush is no Lincoln and has fired no one despite saying he holds Winston Churchill as a role model. Reality Being lazy and not wanting to fight over the years, the GWDWTFs have emasculated the force into being dependant upon firepower bombardment steered by them from remote command posts using mental gadgets to create a quasi-linear battlefield for a support underclass to flourish.
The GWDWTF are used to ordering weak co-dependants around in garrison when they arrive in Iraq move into former dictator palaces and proceed to round up civilians and rough them up to find rebels which just create rebels when you try this stunt on adults. The rebellion grows Wheels The rebels discover the heavy handed American GWDWTFs surprisingly are lazy and snobby and have an underclass that drives around in vulnerable trucks so they proceed to blow them up with glee. They hate tracks because they represent warfighting empowerment for the younger and less ranked unwasheds and actually spending the majority of the time in garrison on combat and not the garrison egomaniac BS they really want to do.
The tactically unsound Stryker rubber tired truck full of "mother may I? RMA vs. If this doesn't alarm you, that reading sound wisdom like Sun Tzu's " The Art of War " is not required to understand the current U.
Army's technotactical course charted, it should alarm you. Since you may not have read the above books, I will summarize. Aside for the neo-fascist bitterness of Heinlein wanting a society where only military veterans can vote and hold elected office, Starship Troopers written in ! The force structure is all teeth, no tail " everybody fights, everybody works " egalitarianism where subordinates are powered down with the ability to take the initiative. This action and sense of shared adventure is what attracts our best young men to join the U.
Military Academy at West Point where idealism is still a virtue. The Army is well underway towards a primitive "Starship Trooper" with its digitized 21st Century Land Warrior program for the dismounted Soldiers of our Army. Fehrenbach's " This Kind of War " which bitterly recounts how the air strike firepower mentality failed in the mud and mountains of Korea in Reading this in conjunction with Van Crevald's Transformation of War, you soon realize man is in the 4th Generation of War where the battle is over the MIND and loyalty of the people themselves.
Series: Concord Firepower Pictorial Series
Whereas 1st generation warfare was hand-to-hand implements, the 2d machines as in firearms, the 3rd maneuver to collapse enemy organizational structures, the 4th generation strategem seeks the dominant will. In 4GW, ALL previous manifestations of war are still in play as possible courses of action, especially on Non-Linear Battlefields NLBs where we simply lack the mass numbers of men to create front and rear "lines".
WAAW offers us an illusion of painless war because we are in an alleged enlightened "third wave" of civilization where computers mentalism replaces the physical 2d Wave as "industrial age" and passe'. Computer mental gymnastics can create mythical "lines" and areas on the battlefield that have not been actually created in reality by troops, to keep everyone in their WWII-style place and role in the Army pecking order. Even though we still live in a world that has to grow food to eat 1st wave and live in physical bodies requiring the physical resources of our earth 2nd wave , the Tofflers offer us a hubristically labeled "Revolution in Military Affairs" RMA feast full of expensive, keep-the-defense-contractors-employed-and-politicians-elected stand-off firepower munitions to destroy mythical enemies who obligingly stand off from us for easy targeting; a fantasy that ironically was condemned as unsound, unworkable tactics and strategy in Starship Troopers even as far back as !
The enemy who doesn't have to abide by our battlefield "lines" frequently "votes" with his RPGs and road-side bombs exploding our wheeled vehicles and men as they operate in "safe" areas we have created in our minds. Its like the Bush Administration declaring the war was over and the "mission accomplished" in Iraq because they said so after their firepower bombardments had no more role to play to get the media limelight.
No discussion of this in the media. At least in part, as the result of the Tofflers' collaboration with some senior officials of the U. This idea of warfare between post-industrial nations i. Don Morelli, who, along with Gen. Donn A. Starry, was working on an overhaul of U. He returned to the subject of the Tofflers' ideas three times during the discussion period. The vastly bigger problem is that the U. The preceding article is a rough version of the article that appeared in The Executive Intelligence Review.
It is made available here with the permission of The Executive Intelligence Review. PGMs launched from sexy, expensive aircraft, soon unmanned ones are all designs of civilian DoD technowonks who never served a day in a uniform and Generals who want to fight wars bureaucratically from the top-down.
See the DoD news story below. Never mind that it was several divisions worth of Army and marine troops marching on Baghdad with some flying in from the north is what compelled the Iraqi regime to collapsethe Tofflerians don't want any money going to these big units, they want ALL DoD monies poured into their gold-plated munitions which they can increase their personal budgetary power and prospects for post retirement employment with a defense contractor. The Toffler's "snake oil" is just what risk-averse politicians, wannabe civilian mandarin technowonks and power-hungry generals would want: a force that doesn't employ large terrain-controlling maneuver which requires trusting lots of young men on the scene making decisions, but a top-down bombardment of the enemy using digital mental means fired from small groups of sexy but expendable special forces teams or small units populated by weak, co-dependants in emasculated VEHICLES like the fragile rubber-tired Lav3stryker armored car and the proposed Future Combat System FCS for the mounted Soldiers of our Army to get into the mouse-clicking firepower act.
The only way to counter RPGs fired from covered and concealed positions was to absorb the hit, identify the source of the fire, and respond with massive overwhelming firepower. Tanks and Bradley s repeatedly sustained hits from RPG's and ground directed anti-aircraft fire that dismounted infantrymen, HMMWVs and other light skinned vehicles could not sustain.
Bradley s successfully protected the infantrymen inside while at the same time delivering a massive volume of fire against dismounted enemy, trucks, tanks, and armored vehicles. The firepower and shock generated by tanks and Bradley s could never have been matched by dismounted infantry. Without the use of these systems initially, the enemy would have caused many more casualties. That firepower-bombardment is an old failed bromide , does not seem to faze those leaders in the Army who want to "unmanned vehicle" the human Soldier out of combat entirely.
While we could name some names of those who prescribe to the Tofflerian hubris , it will do no good to entrench them any further than even their own firepower could root them out. What is happening is while our troops are dying and being maimed in Iraq, back in the safety of the Pentagon, the generals are spending the majority of our money on their pre-war on terror projects excused away because the Iraq counter-insurgency operation is an "exception", real wars will need their expensive war toys like Vs, Fs all tied together by computers for their top-down micro-management and the like.
Even the U. Army War college admits network-centric warfare is a failure in Iraq.
Don't be surprised that in the next round of base closings that Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania suddenly gets eliminated to shut down the voices of reason that sometimes speak from there. The Global War on Terrorism is here to stay. Consequently, we will need to increase the size of our ground forces. We also need to reorganize at the national level to fight it effectively.
Although the Defense budget will remain adequate, the Federal budget deficit and increasing personnel costs including more ground end strength will force hard choices. As a result several favorite programs in all the services may be scaled back. Iraq Reconstruction: Pre-conflict reconstruction planning was done pretty well but lacked integration.